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This research develops a mathematical model of procurement for commodities which
integrates the arbitrage free pricing models for commodities in Finance with the tra-
ditional inventory models of Operations Management. In essence, we develop a model
that uses market determined information on spot and futures prices to ascertain the
optimal procurement strategy. This research is an attempt to understand how firms
should adapt their operating policies in presence of fluctuating commodity prices.
In this research we seek to understand how the term structure of futures
prices at a commodity market can be used in the formulation of procurement and
distribution policies of supply chains under centralized decision making. The differ-
ence between spot and futures prices play an important role in the determination
vii
of the actual cost of holding a commodity; the cost of holding a unit of a tradable
commodity is a random variable whose values are determined by the stochastic evo-
lution of prices at the commodity market, and it is exogenously imposed on the firm.
The benefits derived from storing a unit of the commodity, on the other hand, are
endogenous to each firm and depends on its operational characteristics. Our research
objective is to understand how the internal operational decisions of the firm should
be modified as a function of the spot and futures prices observed in the market, in
order to achieve an optimal balance between cost and benefits of holding an inven-
tory. We model prices with a stochastic process that allows no risk-free arbitrage
opportunities, and in this setting, we characterize optimal procurement and distri-
bution policies for various supply chain structures. In addition, we explore the value
of using two factor price model over one-factor price model on procurement costs.
Our results suggest that there are substantial cost savings in inventory related
costs on incorporating spot and futures price information in the procurement model.
Furthermore, two-factor model yields higher cost savings than using a single factor
model to forecast prices. Distribution of commodities requires the understanding of
price dynamics on the commodity markets as well as the issues related to supply
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Commodities have been traded on organized exchanges for couple of centuries.
Chicago Board of Trade (CBOT) is the prime market to trade agricultural com-
modities such as wheat, oat, and corn. Similarly, New York Mercantile Exchange
(NYMEX) specializes in trading of crude oil and related commodities. London Metal
Exchange (LME) is one of the prominent marketplace to trade metals such as cop-
per, aluminum, zinc etc. In addition, in the recent past we have witnessed the
emergence of several other B2B marketplaces for industrial commodities. These
include Converge and DRAM-Exchange for semiconductors, E-steel for steel, and
Inter-continental paper exchange for paper related products. In addition, several
traditional organized exchanges have started trading industrial commodities. NY-
BOT and CBOT started trading long term futures contracts for ethanol in the year
2005. Also, NYBOT recently introduced futures and option contracts on wood pulp.
London Metal Exchange (LME) started trading futures contracts on plastics, and is
deliberating to start trading futures contracts on steel.
In general, the spot price of a commodity reflects the existing dynamics of
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supply and demand in the market, whereas futures prices reflect the anticipated
demand and supply equilibrium in the future. Moreover, the information generated
by the futures markets can also be useful in negotiating forward contracts between
buyers and suppliers of the commodity since the future price dictated by the market
contains more information on demand/supply dynamics than the information held
by individual buyers and suppliers. The role of futures market in hedging risk has
been very well researched in the literature of Economics and Finance. However, in
this research, we seek to understand additional benefits of observing futures price
curve of a commodity in the development of procurement policies.
In this research, we seek to understand how the term structure of futures
prices at a commodity market can be used in the formulation of procurement and
distribution policies of supply chains under centralized decision making. The differ-
ence between spot and futures prices play an important role in the determination
of the actual cost of holding a commodity; the cost of holding a unit of a traded
commodity is a random variable whose values are determined by the stochastic evo-
lution of prices at the commodity market, and it is exogenously imposed on the firm.
The benefits derived from storing a unit of the commodity, on the other hand, are
endogenous to each firm and depend on its operational characteristics. Our research
objective is to understand how the internal operational decisions of the firm should
be modified as a function of the spot and futures prices observed in the market.
We model prices with a stochastic process that allows no risk-free arbitrage oppor-
tunities, and in this setting, we characterize optimal procurement and distribution
policies for various supply chain structures. We consider a problem of single location,
serial distribution, and multiple location distribution network.
The third chapter of the dissertation deals with a single location problem.
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Manufacturers often rely on different types of long term contracts with established
suppliers to procure goods often involving delivery lead times. Commodity markets
as well as online markets provide additional procurement flexibility; manufacturers
can procure through their conventional channels or interact directly with the market
either through spot or forward transactions. In this chapter, we explore the value
of incorporating information about spot and futures market prices in procurement
decision making of a commodity user who satisfies a random demand of a finished
product. We also model transaction costs associated with procurement from spot
and forward markets. Due to shorter response times, transaction costs associated
with spot market procurement (including freight) are typically higher. We develop
optimal and approximate procurement policies for this problem, and our results sug-
gest that it is possible to significantly reduce inventory related costs by incorporating
spot and futures price information in the procurement decision making process. Our
results also imply that, apart from risk reduction, the potential savings in transac-
tion costs associated with forward procurement entice manufacturers to procure a
relatively higher fraction of goods from forward markets, using spot procurement
only to fine tune stocking levels and recover from emergencies.
The fourth chapter of the dissertation extends the analysis from a single
location, and models procurement and distribution of commodity in a serial and
distributive supply chain. In this study, the commodity is procured at the cen-
tral location and then shipped downstream to the retailers. Our analysis illustrate
how market determined spot and futures price information can be used to develop
an efficient procurement and distribution policy. We obtain an optimal solution
for serial distribution system, however, for multiple location distribution system we
characterize the optimal solution and develop bounds on the cost function that are
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robust for non-stationary demand and non-identical retailers. Commodity procure-
ment and distribution has evolved as a big business in the energy industry after
the de-regulation of various commodities. This chapter is a step in developing the
understanding of supply chains of commodities.
Once the procurement policies have been developed, we empirically evaluate
the relevance of such policies in the fifth chapter of dissertation. In particular, we
explore the effect of additional term structure information of futures prices on the
procurement policies from the spot market. In this regards, we compare the policies
developed from one-factor stochastic price model with the policies developed using
a two-factor model. In addition, we also explore the benefits of frequent calibration
of stochastic price process on the procurement cost structure of a firm. We conclude
through our analysis that for gasoline the procurement policies which use futures
price forecasts based on a two-factor model yields substantial cost reductions in
comparison to policies that use futures price forecasts based on the single factor
model. This result entails due to the ability of a two-factor model to capture the time
varying marginal convenience yield better than the one-factor model. In addition, we
do not observe any advantage of calibrating stochastic price model more frequently





There are three areas of operations management literature related to this research;
inventory management models allowing multiple modes of supply, inventory man-
agement models allowing supply to multiple location, and procurement models con-
sidering access to commodity markets.
2.1 Multiple Modes of Supply
Models with multiple modes of supply have been extensively researched in the oper-
ations management literature. We refer readers to Fukuda (1964), Whittemore and
Saunders (1977), Moinzadeh and Lee (1989), Chiang and Gutierrez (1998), Lawson
and Porteus (2000), Tagaras and Vlachos (2001), and references therein. The above
papers differ in their consideration of expediting options, inventory review (continu-
ous or periodic), number of echelons, and cost structure (variable and set-up costs)
associated with different modes of supply; however, the common theme in this line of
research is the consideration of modes of supply with smaller lead times in exchange
for an additional known cost. The models trade the additional cost of faster supply
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in the presence of demand uncertainty against the benefits of lower expected costs
of shortage and storage over the smaller lead time.
2.2 Multi-echelon Models
The Operations Management literature has paid considerable attention to research
on the problem of devising procurement and allocation policies for multi-echelon
inventory systems. Clark and Scarf (1960) obtained the optimal solution for a serial
multi-echelon model, and their work lead to a very rich body of literature on multi-
echelon models. Fukuda (1964) derived an optimal solution for a problem with
dual modes of supply when one mode of supply lags the other by one time period.
Zhang (1996) obtained a stationary myopic policy for a dual supply mode under
infinite horizon framework. Moinzadeh and Lee (1989) model dual modes of supply
in a continuous review setting. In addition, Lawson and Porteus (2000) extend the
framework of Clark and Scarf (1960) by modeling regular and expedited modes of
supply; they show that top-down base stock policies are optimal, and obtain optimal
myopic policy for stationary infinite horizon case.
Two echelon systems involving a central procurement facility as an upper
echelon and multiple downstream locations have been traditionally difficult to solve
for optimal procurement and distribution policies. Clark and Scarf (1960) illus-
trated that it is intractable to obtain an optimal solution for the problem due to the
large state space of the stochastic models. To deal with this problem, researchers
have repeatedly resorted to approximations to obtain near optimal solutions. In
this regards, a “balancing of inventory” assumption is very common, this assumption
is made on the grounds that it is possible to bring all the retailers to a common
normalized inventory level before any shipment is made from the warehouse to the
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retailers. Eppen and Schrage (1981) study a centralized order system where differ-
ent demand locations place orders from a central warehouse in fixed cycles; they
characterize the optimal ordering policy as (m, y), assuming the probability of stock
imbalance as negligible, where m is the period in which order is placed, and y is the
inventory position. Federgruen and Zipkin (1984) also apply the balancing assump-
tion for a periodic review finite horizon model, in order to propose a solution for the
dynamic program that approximates the original problem by collapsing the large
state space to a single variable; allowing for a computational solution. Jonsson and
Silver (1987) employs the same assumption, but allows for complete redistribution
of inventory during the order cycle to mitigate the perils of imbalance in inventory.
Jackson (1988) explores the allocation policy to the retailers in a multi-period model,
where a pre-specified quantity of stock available at the warehouse is to be allocated
amongst retailers following a base stock policy until the warehouse falls short of stock
and fails in maintaining the base stock inventory at the retailers. In this “run out”
period, allocation policies are developed assuming balancing of inventory for identi-
cal retailers. Erkip et al. (1990) extend the model of Eppen and Schrage (1981) to
include the possibility of correlation in demand across retailers and time.
Zipkin (1984) addresses the issue of imbalances in inventory and postulates
that for a system with equal coefficients of variation of demand, the approximation
of myopic allocation yields near optimal solution. Similarly, Federgruen and Zipkin
(1982) illustrate through numerical results that policies based on the balancing as-
sumption for systems with non-identical retailers can lead to significant imbalances
in inventory for future periods. Non-optimality of balancing policies in non-identical
retailers is also shown by Jackson and Muckstadt (1989), and McGavin et al. (1997).
The above described models consider that the price of the commodity remains sta-
7
tionary over a finite horizon. However, this assumption is restrictive in comparison
to what actually is observed in the supply chains, thus, in our model, we allow for
prices to fluctuate from one period to another. Imbalance of inventory can be exac-
erbated in environments of non-identical retailers where prices are also fluctuating
because it will lead to more dispersion in optimal stocking policy across retailers
and time. Significantly, in this research, we seek to develop policies that can account
for stochastic prices under a framework of one warehouse and multiple non-identical
retailers in order to minimize the supply chain costs. Next, we discuss the emerging
literature on procurement from commodity markets.
2.3 Procurement from Commodity Markets
Spot markets provide flexibility for commodity users as it allows them to fine tune
their stocking and production policies under uncertain demand and supply environ-
ment. Spot markets play an important role in clearing of market through adjust-
ments in prices, which eventually leads to more efficient allocation of resources. As an
observation, spot markets have proliferated in energy markets after the de-regulation
of natural gas, electricity and other energy related commodities. Traditionally, in
commodity markets of copper and oil two-part pricing existed; one was a contract
price between the buyer and the manufacturer, and the other was the price listed
on commodity exchange Hubbard and Weiner (1989). However, over a period of
time contract pricing in copper and oil markets along with many other commod-
ity markets have ceased to exist. Hubbard and Weiner (1989) provide support to
their hypothesis through econometric analysis that the importance of spot markets
in copper and oil commodity markets is due to the speed of adjustment in prices
pertaining to imbalances in demand and supply. As a result, any shock in demand
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and supply of a commodity gets reflected in the spot price of the commodity. This
leads to fluctuating spot prices, which exacerbates the procurement strategy from
the spot market. Spot prices fluctuate more in comparison to the futures prices as
postulated by Samuelson (1965) and Fama and French (1988). On one hand spot
markets provide flexibility in procurement, on the other hand, they pose a challenge
in designing procurement policies due to fluctuating prices. Significantly, we develop
procurement policies from spot market under presence of volatile cash prices.
Growth in B2B markets has lead to the development of literature in Oper-
ations Management on procurement from spot markets. In particular, researchers
have explored the optimal mix of long-term and short-term contracts to reduce cost
and enhance flexibility in supply chains. In this regards, Seifert and Thonemann
(2004) explore the procurement and selling policies in a spot market under fluc-
tuating prices and random demand. Similarly, Fu et al. (2006) design an optimal
portfolio of optimal contracts when demand is uncertain and prices are stochastic.
Cohen and Agrawal (1999) also evaluate the trade-off between long-term and short
term contracts by developing a bi-nominal model of price variation. They conclude
that there is no single dominant strategy of procuring contracts. Akella et al. (2002)
model the optimal allocation of supply capacity before observing the realization of a
random demand. In their model, if the realized demand is greater than the allocated
capacity then the residual demand gets satisfied from the spot market at the mar-
ket price. Yi and Scheller-Wolf (2003) model procurement under two supply modes
where one mode offers a contract at known price, and the other mode of procurement
is through a spot market at unknown price. Ritchken and Tapiero (1986) employ
contingent claim analysis to mitigate price and demand risk in designing inventory
management policies. Mendelson and Tunca (2007) propose an endogenous model of
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interaction between a single supplier and multiple manufacturers where sourcing is
done through a fixed price contract and spot procurement, and describe the strategic
interaction amongst the players and its influence on the formulation of fixed-price
contract and the supply chain efficiency. Mendelson and Tunca (2007) conclude that
increase in the number of manufacturers leads to a shift in procurement from fixed-
price contracts to spot procurement, this makes the supply chain fully coordinated
and informationally efficient. This result is aligned with the findings of Hubbard and
Weiner (1989), and can be explained by the following argument. Since due to glob-
alization the number of potential manufacturers in the market place have increased,
we observe the extinction of fixed price contracts from oil and copper markets. Golo-
vachkina (2003) design an option contract between a supplier and a manufacturer
with limited capacity, and demonstrate that the channel can be almost coordinated
if the margins on spot market are high. Etzion and Pinker (2004) models a spot
market that consists of two suppliers, one that sells in a spot market and satisfies
stochastic demand from other source, and the second supplier only sells in the spot
market. Etzion and Pinker (2004) obtain conditions on the size of the spot market
under which one type of supplier benefits over the other. Milner and Kouvelis (2002)
study the impact of speculative behavior in non-commodity markets on long-term
contracts. They determine the spot price through a market clearing mechanism,
including inventory parameters and expected future demand, in a multi-firm en-
vironment; thus, demonstrating the influence of the inventory positions of several
firms on market prices under an infinite horizon model. Furthermore, Kleindorfer
and Wu (2003) provide a comprehensive overview of the literature in the area of
B2B exchanges, in particular, their paper focuses on the efficient integration of long
term and short term contracts through options on capacity. We also refer readers
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to Haksoz and Seshadri (2005) for more comprehensive review on spot procurement
related research.
Price uncertainty has also been studied by several researchers in the context
of inventory policy. Gurnani and Tang (1999) obtain an optimal ordering policy for
a retailer who orders a seasonal product from a manufacturer in two stages. In this
model, a retailer faces the trade-off between a certain price and uncertain demand
in a period versus a stochastic price and improved demand information in a second
period. Similarly, Kouvelis and Gutierrez (1997) consider a model with price vari-
ability due to exchange rate risk in a news-vendor problem with a two stage sale
season in two different countries. Golabi (1985) obtain ordering policies when prices
are stochastic and follow a known distribution. Similarly, Wang (2001) investigated
inventory replenishment policy under the influence of decreasing prices, and stochas-
tic demand in a multi-period model. Wang (2001) prove myopic policy to be optimal
and characterize the optimal procurement policies for the lost sales. However, the
problem of obtaining an optimal procurement strategy becomes more complex if the
prices follow a continuous distribution. In this context, Li and Kouvelis (1999) study
supply contracts to satisfy a deterministic demand under procurement price uncer-
tainty, and evaluate optimal procurement policies for time-flexible and time-inflexible
contracts. They illustrate that adequately structured risk-sharing contracts provide
opportunities for profit through sourcing from volatile price environments. However,
as they comment, this problem gets more complex if demand is stochastic and cost
is minimized over multiple periods. Significantly, it is the uncertainty of demand
and price of storable commodities in a multi-period environment that we model in
this research. Berling and Rosling (2005) explore the impact of financial risk on the
procurement policy in a EOQ model, and conclude that major financial risk in the
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inventory control is due to the systematic purchase price risk, and infer that the
systematic risk due to demand has a negligible effect. However, Berling and Rosling
(2005) assume a constant convenience yield in determining the financial risk asso-
ciated with the purchase cost. Significantly, in our research we demonstrate that
an inventory model which incorporates stochasticity of convenience yield leads to
a substantial savings in inventory related costs over the constant convenience yield
model.
Spot markets are very prominent in the electricity markets, and this has
lead to a growing body of literature related to spot procurement in electricity mar-
kets. Spot electricity prices fluctuate considerably due to the non-storable nature
of the electricity. Absence of inventory dissuades smoothening of consumption lead-
ing to sharp spikes in prices, for example electricity prices in US Midwest rose from
$30/MWh to $7000/MWh during June 1998, Trebing (2000). Since electricity cannot
be stored arbitrage free pricing methods cannot be used to develop pricing models,
thus, Bessembinder and Lemmon (2002) obtain forward prices using an equilibrium
approach. Routledge et al. (2001) also obtain forward prices through an equilibrium
model where they draw a connection between the natural gas and electricity prices
as natural gas can act as an inventory for electricity. Dong and Liu (2003) also inves-
tigate forward contracts on non-storable commodities in presence of spot markets.
They consider the market power of a risk-averse manufacturer and a supplier in the
forward market, and conclude that in non-storable commodities the forward price
could be non-monotonic in the spot price.
The US economy consumes around 20 million barrels per day of petroleum
products that are transported through a complex network of pipelines that, accord-
ing to association of oil pipe lines, accounts for 17% of the total transportation
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volume of the economy. However, the literature related to supply chain management
of commodities is very scant in spite of its substantial contribution to the economy.
Following we review examples of research on supply chain management of commodi-
ties. Reiman and Wein (1999), model the distribution of gasoline from warehouse
to the retailers. The focus of their paper is to ascertain transportation policies
under a queuing model framework using heavy traffic approximations. One of the
first papers to analyze the supply chain of a commodity in equilibrium is written
by Tayur and Yang (2002), they analyze the supply chain of natural gas connected
by two markets at two ends. Equilibrium and uniqueness of prices are shown as a
function of inventory level in these markets. In this regards, Goel and Gutierrez
(2007a) propose an optimal inventory policy that incorporates the marginal conve-
nience yield, exogenously determined by the market, in the decision making of an
individual firm. They show that incorporating time varying marginal convenience
yield in the optimal stocking policy yields substantial reduction in inventory related
costs. In addition, Goel and Gutierrez (2007b) demonstrate that price information
on spot and forward contracts observed in the commodity markets can be used to
obtain better procurement and distribution policies in a supply chain. Similarly,
Secomandi (2007) characterize the optimal policy for storage of natural gas as a
two price state variable dependent base stock levels. Natural gas storage technology
requires inventory levels to determine the capacity function on the storage facility,
thus the operational aspects of inventory management can influence the trading pol-
icy of a natural gas merchant. In a related research, Wang et al. (2007) develop
a stochastic-dynamic model to determine an optimal release policy of natural gas
from a downstream re-gasification facility into the whole sale market. Distribution
of commodities is operationally intensive and require the combined understanding of
13
financial markets and supply chain issues. Unfortunately, there is not much litera-
ture on issues dealing with supply chain of commodities. This research is an attempt
to enrich this small body of emerging literature.
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Chapter 3
Optimal Procurement Policies for
a Single Echelon
3.1 Introduction
Procurement and inventory management models in the operations management and
supply chain management literature usually assume constant or known procurement
prices while modeling in detail transaction costs, storage costs and costs associated
with fulfilling a stochastic demand. In this research, we explore how exogenously
determined random shocks in procurement costs affect operating decisions of a firm.
In particular, we explore in detail the procurement process of commodities whose
prices are subject to random shocks due to demand and supply fluctuations. Com-
modity prices exhibit volatility and substantial cyclical behavior that exacerbates the
complexity of procurement for the commodity users. In this research, we develop op-
timal and approximate procurement policies of a commodity under stochastic prices
and random demand. This research is motivated by crude oil procurement decisions
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faced by oil companies in their refinery operations. In a refinery, a sequence of com-
plex operations are undertaken before crude oil gets refined to the desired petroleum
products. Distillation of crude yields several by-products, the lightest fractions are
gases that chiefly consists of ethane, propane and butane that are used either as
fuel or as petrochemical feedstock. Lighter distillates comprise motor and aviation
gasoline while heavier fractions yield kerosene, gas oil and residue oil. Residue oil
is further used to produce lubricating oils, waxes and bitumen Shell (1983) (pg 244-
245). Crude oil is a mix of different hydrocarbon compounds, and the proportion
of the various hydrocarbons in the mix varies according to the origin of the crude
oil. Table 3.1 illustrates this fact. Moreover, even for each type of crude oil the
actual proportions of the different hydrocarbons can marginally vary from reservoir
to reservoir.
Table 3.1: Yields for Different Type of Crude Oil Percentage by Volume
For a refinery operator, technically it is feasible to produce any refined prod-
uct from any type of crude, however, it may not be economically feasible to do so.
Thus, refiners often blend different types of crude in order to economically satisfy
the demand for various refined products Jones (1995). Processing of crude oil be-
gins when oil tankers bring crude oil to the docking station of an oil terminal from
where oil is pumped into storage tanks. Typically, refiners have dedicated storage
tanks for each type of crude. From these storage tanks oil is fed to charging tanks
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where different types of crudes are mixed in a proportion that depends on the actual
hydrocarbon content mix of each type of crude oil in storage and on the desired
mix of the refined products. This pre-mixed crude is fed from the charging tanks to
cracking and distillation units for the distillation process. This is illustrated in Fig-
ure 3.1. Furthermore, market variations in the demand for refined products induce
additional fluctuations in the production schedule of a refinery Paolucci et al. (2002),
which affects the blending operations, therefore, creating an uncertainty about the
requirements of a particular type of crude oil. Significantly, in this research we de-
velop optimal inventory policies applicable to each particular type of crude oil which
faces uncertain demand requirements, and it is also subject to fluctuations in prices
as dictated by the oil market.
Figure 3.1: Description of Refinery Operation
Another application of our research is in the management of inventories in the
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jet fuel supply chain. Some commercial airlines, unable to manage the fluctuations
in the price of jet fuel, have outsourced the procurement process to companies with
expertise in commodities trading and hedging. For example, United Airlines has out-
sourced the procurement process of jet fuel to Morgan Stanley Davis (2005). Morgan
Stanley, an investment bank, has expertise in the trading of commodity futures con-
tracts, but has not traditionally dealt with the physical delivery of commodities.
Recently it has been making investments in storage facilities, pipelines and tankers
to facilitate efficient physical distribution and delivery of jet fuel. To effectively
manage the physical distribution of jet fuel, Morgan Stanley will need to confront
a number of supply chain and logistics issues that as an investment bank it did not
need to confront in the past. It is increasingly becoming evident that the efficient
procurement process of commodities requires the understanding of spot and futures
markets in addition to the know how of supply chain management. Significantly,
in this research we model the procurement decisions of a firm that operates in an
environment where it deals with spot procurements and also requires the knowledge
of forward markets to satisfy random demand.
Applications of this research are not limited to the above two examples as
commodities have been traded in organized markets for couple of centuries now.
Chicago Board of Trade (CBOT) is the prime market to trade agricultural com-
modities such as wheat, oat, and corn. Similarly, New York Mercantile Exchange
(NYMEX) specializes in trading of crude oil and related commodities. London Metal
Exchange (LME) is one of the prominent marketplace to trade metals such as cop-
per, aluminum, zinc etc. In addition, in the recent past we have witnessed the
emergence of several other B2B marketplaces for industrial commodities. These
include Converge and DRAM-Exchange for semiconductors, E-steel for steel, and
18
Inter-continental paper exchange for paper related products. Our model, in princi-
ple, is applicable to manage the procurement process of any commodity that has an
organized market.
The mathematical model developed in this chapter has an objective to model
the effects of spot and futures price variability on inventory management/procurement
decision making process in a multi period framework. We model the refiner as a price
taker, and model commodity prices using a continuous time stochastic process that
offers no risk free arbitrage opportunities. The refiners decision making process is
modeled through a discrete time stochastic dynamic program that samples price in-
formation from the continuous time price stochastic process at each decision making
epoch. In practice, companies make ad hoc decisions regarding spot market procure-
ment, and to our knowledge, no inventory management model has been proposed to
integrate commodity markets (that deal with spot and forward contract for storable
commodities) in the procurement decisions of the firm.
Although all firms are price takers in the commodity market, the term struc-
ture of the futures price affect the internal cost of commodity users. Hence, it is
judicious on part of the commodity users to adjust operating policies in lieu of the
changes in spot and futures prices as reflected on the commodity markets. The con-
cept of marginal convenience yield, as discussed in detail in the following section,
provides the link between the term structure of the futures price and the effective
cost of holding a commodity. In this research, we model the transaction cost as-
sociated with the physical flow of goods, and incorporate the concept of marginal
convenience yield to illustrate the gains in efficiency which amounts to the reduction
in inventory related costs to around 20%. This highlights the importance of this
research that seeks to explore the value of including term structure of futures prices
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in the effective cost management policies.
3.2 Stochastic Price Model for Storable Commodities
In order to keep the exposition self-contained, in this section, we briefly introduce
the literature on evolution of spot and futures commodity prices, we introduce and
discuss the definition of marginal convenience yield, and we introduce the two-factor
stochastic price model of Schwartz and Smith (2000) that models evolution of spot
and future prices. We denote St as the spot price of the commodity at time t, and
E [St+1] as the expected spot price at time t+ 1 evaluated at time t. We define the
unit holding cost per period as h, and the one-period discount factor as β.
3.2.1 Determination of Futures Prices for Storable Commodities.
Keynes (1930) proposed a theory of futures market equilibrium that allowed for a
difference or bias between futures prices observed at period t for a future period
τ + t, ft,t+τ , and the expected spot price at a future period t+ τ evaluated at time
t, E[St+τ ]. Keynes argued that this bias1 was necessary as a profit for speculators
to hold risk for the processors who are willing to sacrifice some amount of expected
profit in order to minimize their risk. On the other hand, Samuelson (1965) reasoned
that futures prices are obtained by the current expectations of the spot price in the
corresponding future period, and postulated that the futures price is an unbiased
estimator of the expected spot price, E[St+τ ] = ft,t+τ . Dusak (1973) and Marcus
(1984), through empirical studies, did not find any bias in the futures and expected
spot prices for commodities. However, the empirical work of Houthakker (1957),
Fama and French (1987), and Bessembinder and Chan (1992) found the existence of
1Specifically, Keynes argued that ft,t+τ < E[st+τ ], and estimated this difference to be about
10% per year for agricultural commodities.
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risk premium in financial and commodity markets. Our model allows both biased
and unbiased futures prices, and our structural results are not contingent on futures
price bias. The important difference is related to the implementation of our model
and results; as we will discuss in section 3.4, If the commodity market shows a bias
between futures and expected spot prices, a statistical analysis of the stochastic
evolution of prices is necessary. On the other hand, if the market shows no such
bias, all necessary information is directly observable from the commodity market’s
prices.
3.2.2 Convenience Yield of Storable Industrial Commodities.
At a period t, we can compare the cost of buying and storing a unit of an industrial
commodity with the present value of the cost of buying it in the futures market for
delivery next period. To this effect define δ̂ = St + h − βft,t+1. As discussed in
Williams and Wright (1991) δ̂ ≥ 0 and it determines the true cost of holding a unit
in inventory. To quote Pindyck (2001):
“... although the price of storage is not directly observed, it can be
determined from the spread between futures and spot prices. This price
of storage is equal to the marginal value of storage, i.e., the flow of
benefits to inventory holders from a marginal unit of inventory, and it is
termed the marginal convenience yield.”
Consistent with Pindyck (2001), we call the quantity δ̂ the marginal convenience
yield of holding the commodity, and it is interpreted as a premium paid for holding
the commodity physically over the cost of owning a contract for future delivery. The
reason for this premium is that holding the commodity physically will certainly give
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the holder the option to have it next period, but it may also present more profitable
opportunities or uses before time t+ 1.
According to Pindyck (2001), for the aggregate market the benefit of holding
inventory equals the effective cost of holding it. Moreover, the process that generates
the benefits of holding inventory is not observable at the market level, but the cost
of holding inventory can be observed through the spread between spot and futures
prices. The cost benefit equivalence stated by Pindyck does not automatically hold
true internally for an individual firm, thus, to achieve this equilibrium internally in
the firm it is required to adjust the operating policies in response to the fluctuations
in the convenience yield dictated by the market. Each individual firm will have a
different marginal benefit of holding inventory based on its operating characteristics
and its own business environment, however, the cost of holding inventory is imposed
exogenously by the evolution of prices in the market.
To summarize, one of the main objectives of this research is to understand how
convenience yield information, as implied by the evolution of spot and futures prices,
affects optimal procurement policies for a commodity user. From the perspective of
a commodity user the value of this premium is endogenously generated by his own
business and process characteristics but the effective cost of holding inventories δ̂t,
changes randomly from period to period and it is determined exogenously by the
evolution of spot and futures market prices.
3.2.3 Schwartz and Smith (2000) Two Factor Model
The two factor model of commodity pricing developed by Schwartz and Smith (2000)
allows for short-term variation in prices, and uncertainty in the long term level of
prices. The short term deviation in prices is defined as the difference between the
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current price and the long term price. These deviations may arise due to the inherent
shocks in demand and supply, and the inability of the market participants to quickly
adapt to the evolving market conditions. In Schwartz and Smith (2000) model, the
price at time t is denoted as St, and it is explained as the combination of two effects:
the short-term deviation factor χt, and the long-term equilibrium factor ωt, such
that ln(St) = χt + ωt. The short-term deviations χt are assumed to revert toward
zero following an Ornstein-Uhlenbeck process
dχt = −κχtdt+ σχdZ (3.1)
and the long term factor is assumed to evolve randomly according to a Geometric
Brownian Motion with drift factor reflecting the prospects of future supply, techno-
logical advancements, inflationary pressures and regulatory considerations, as
dωt = µdt+ σωdW (3.2)
where dZ and dW are the increments of Brownian Motion that are related as
dZ.dW = ρdt. The parameter κ is the rate of mean reversion in the short term
deviations, σχ is the volatility associated with the short term deviation factor, σω is
the volatility associated with the changes in the long term equilibrium factor. Here,
it is important to understand the relationship between the spot price at time t, St,
the expected spot price next period E[St+1], and the futures price for the commodity
observed at time t for delivery at t+ 1, ft. The difference between futures price and
the expected spot price can be explained as the risk-premium of the futures contract
while the current price and the expected spot price next period are related by the
marginal convenience yield. Below we elaborate on these two concepts.
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3.2.4 Risk Premium
The futures price for period t+ 1 observed at time t, denoted as ft can be obtained
as ft = EQ[St+1], where the superscript Q is used to denote that the expectation
is taken using the risk-neutral probability measure, Harrison and Kreps (1979) .
Similarly, the expected spot price at period t + 1 evaluated in period t, denoted
as f̂t is obtained as f̂t = EP[St+1], where superscript P is used to denote that
the expectation is taken using the historical probability measure. The relationship
between ft and f̂t is given by f̂t = ft + ϑt, where ϑt is the risk premium associated
with holding the commodity futures contract from period t to t + 1. Schwartz and
Smith (2000), show that the expected spot price at time T is evaluated at time t as










On the other hand, the futures price observed at time t for the contract at
matures at time T is given as













From (3.3) and (3.4) the risk premium is equal to λω(T−t)+(1−e−κ(T−t))λχκ .
If the maturity date of the futures contracts is distant then (1 − e−κ(T−t))λχκ tends
towards zero and the risk premium in the commodity price is exclusively dominated
by λω, the risk premium due to long term deviations. Also, if the mean reverting
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factor κ is large, it reduces the impact of λχ, short-term risk premium on the overall
risk premium of the commodity. There is an ongoing debate in the finance and
economics literature about the risk premium in commodities. Keynes (1930) argued
that there is a positive risk premium for holding commodities as hedgers transfer
risk to speculators and in return speculators demand risk premium. Risk premium
may not exist over a long time period horizon, but it may exist in short term. This
model allows computation of risk premium for short time periods as well.
3.3 Mathematical Model
In our modeling framework we consider a periodic review inventory model with
stochastic demand in which there are two modes of procurement available to a risk-
neutral firm, the traditional mode of procurement, in which the manufacturer enters
into a contract with a supplier through a forward contract agreeing to buy a number
of units to be delivered at a point in the future at set price, and the second mode of
procurement which consists of trading in a commodity spot market (or alternatively,
buying the commodity from a third party at spot market prices). Additionally,
the manufacturer can also utilize the commodity market to sell excess inventory.
Moreover, we assume that the units of the commodity bought in the spot market are
delivered immediately after they are ordered, but before demand is observed, whereas
the units bought through a forward contract at the beginning of the period are to
be delivered at the beginning of the next decision making period. The inventory
sold in the spot market is withdrawn immediately, before any customer demand is
observed. We also allow for the sale of inventory through a forward contract; in
this case the inventory sold shall be made available to the buyer by the beginning
of the next period. In this model, we consider a finite number of decision making
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periods; at the beginning of each decision period, the procurement manager needs
to ascertain the amount of the commodity he will buy or sell in the spot market, as
well as the amount he will buy or sell using a forward contract. For simplicity, in this
research we will refer to forward contracts executed at futures prices simply as futures
market transactions; although technically the two transactions are different2, for our
modeling purposes they are equivalent. These spot and futures trading decisions are
made at the beginning of each period (before demand is realized) with the objective
of minimizing procurement, inventory holding and backlogging cost. Procurement
decisions are based on the initial inventory, the spot market price, the marginal
convenience yield reflected by the market spot and futures price, and the anticipated
demand.
The inventory manager first estimates future demand requirements, then
places orders for future delivery through normal supply channels, finally the pres-
ence of the spot market creates additional opportunity to adjust inventories before
the selling period starts. The decision problem introduced above can arise in two
different ways; the inventory manager may trade directly in the commodity market,
or alternatively he can engage in spot and forward transactions with his traditional
supplier or a third-party logistics provider. In the second case, our modeling frame-
work still needs the existence of a commodity market to generate the spot and futures
prices even though the manufacturer will not buy or sell any physical goods in this
market, and we further assume that all spot and forward transactions are executed
at market prices.
We next enumerate the assumptions made in this model, and discuss their
2Forward contracts are not traded on an exchange, and are settled by delivering the commodity,
whereas futures contracts are traded on an exchange and can be settled by offsetting the current
position (long or short) by taking an exact opposite position. Forward prices are equivalent to
futures prices as long as interest rates are constant (Hull 2003).
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relevance. First, in section 3.3.1 we assume that transaction costs are negligible.
This is an assumption that has been widely made in the finance literature, and it
is appropriate when we are only concerned with executing financial transactions to
take or to close long or short market positions. In this model we define transaction
costs more broadly to include also transportation costs, handling costs and other
clerical costs associated with taking delivery from or delivering to a commodity
market. This simplified model, described in section 3.3.1, will assist us in gaining
preliminary insights on the trade-off between storage costs, backlogging costs and
marginal convenience yield. Finally in section 3.3.2 we consider the case in which
significant transaction costs are associated with both spot and forward transactions.
In this case we further assume that transaction costs in the forward market are
smaller than in the spot market. This assumption is justified because the lead time
associated with forward market transactions allow for more cost efficient scheduling
and contracting of transportation. Throughout the paper we assume that unsatisfied
demand is backlogged and that each unit of the finished product requires one unit
of the commodity.
The cost of holding a unit in inventory over a review period is h, and the cost
of backlogging one unit of finished product for one period is denoted by p. Demand
is considered to be non-negative and stochastic in each period t, and its probability
mass function is denoted by φt. The distribution of demand φt(ξt) is independent
of St. Operationally, it means that the demand ξt of the final product does not get
affected by the spot price of the commodity; in the short-term the requirements of
the commodity are inelastic relative to price. As our model is concerned with short-
term procurement decisions, this is a reasonable assumption. The expected holding
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h(zt − ξ)φt(ξ) dξ +
∫ ∞
zt
p(ξ − zt)φt(ξ) dξ
The derivative of the above loss function with respect to zt is
∂Lt(zt)
∂zt
= −p + (p +
h)Φt(zt), where Φt(·) is the probability distribution function of the demand.
3.3.1 Optimal Procurement Policy with no Transaction Costs.
With the purpose of studying the fundamental effects of a commodity market on
optimal procurement policies we assume in this section that there are no transaction
costs in spot market procurement. A stochastic dynamic program formulation is
developed to identify policies that minimize expected holding cost, penalty cost, and
procurement cost. The three state variables of the dynamic program are the current
inventory level xt, the short-term price factor χt, and the long-term price factor ωt,
respectively. The decision variable is the inventory level zt after trading in the spot
market. Any spot purchase made at time t must arrive before the demand at time
t is observed. The discount factor β is defined as β = e−r∆t, where ∆t is the time
interval between consecutive periodic review periods, and r is the annual interest
rate. The cost to go function is calculated under a risk neutral measure, thus, we
can discount the cost to go function at a risk free rate. A mathematical formulation
of the optimal cost function is given by
Vt(xt, χt, ωt) = minzt
{











VT (xT , χT , ωT ) = −STxT
where, St = exp(χt + ωt). Although St is a function of χt and ωt for notational









0 Vt+1(zt − ξt, χ, ω)φt(ξ) ψt(χ, ω|χt, ωt) dχ dω dξ .
The triple integral in (3.6) is to be interpreted as the expected value over the
demand distribution φt(ξt) and the Riemann integral over conditional joint distri-
bution of (χt+∆t, ωt+∆t) given (χt, ωt) denoted as ψt(χ, ω|χt, ωt), where ψt3 is the
historical probability distribution implied by the two factor stochastic process of
price described in section 3.2.1
Lemma 3.1. Characterization of Vt.
The cost function Vt(xt, χt, ωt) is linear in xt, and ∂∂xtVt = −St.
Proof: Immediate by defining Jt(zt, χt, ωt) as








Vt+1(zt − ξt, χ, ω)φt(ξ) ψt(χ, ω|χt, ωt) dξ dχ dω,
hence, Vt(xt, χt, ωt) = min {Jt(zt, χt, ωt)} − stxt♦.
Next we characterize optimal procurement policies, and draw some managerial im-
3ψt(χ, ω|χt, ωt) is the probability density that the long term price factor and short term price
factor in time t+ 1, assume the values (χ, ω) given that their values at time t are (χt, ωt).
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plications.
Theorem 3.1. Characterization of Optimal Procurement Policies.
The optimal policy for procurement from spot market is characterized by a point z∗t
such that if xt ≤ z∗t then we buy z∗t − xt commodity units from the spot market,
otherwise we sell xt − z∗t units in the spot market.









∂Vt+1(zt − ξt, χ, ω)
∂zt
(3.8)
From Lemma 3.1 we know that ∂∂ztVt+1(zt− ξt, χ, ω) = −St+1. Thus, it follows from
the definition of ψt(χ, ω|χt, ωt) and from the definition of risk neutral measure that
EQ(χ,ω|χt,ωt)St+1 = ft, hence the optimal zt satisfies
∂Jt(zt, χt, ωt)
∂zt
= St − p+ (p+ h)Φt(zt)− βft = 0. (3.9)
Denoting as z∗t the value of zt that solves the above equation, we get
Φt(z∗t ) =




It is worth noting that the above optimal procurement policy is myopic in
nature, and it can be characterized as a critical-point in the sense that if the inventory
level is higher than the critical point, z∗t , then we should sell the excess inventory
in the spot market, but if the inventory level is lower than the critical point, z∗t , we
should buy the difference between z∗t and the current inventory level from the spot
market. We will refer to the ratio in (3.10) as a critical ratio, and it can be interpreted
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as follows, If we buy a unit and hold it, we pay a premium for overstocking this extra
unit and is given by
co = St + h− βE(St+1) = St + h− βft
This can be interpreted as the cost of buying the unit at a price st, then holding
it for the next period at a cost of h, and in doing so saving an expected present
value of βEQ(St+1) by not having to purchase it in the next period. This cost of
overstocking, co, corresponds to Pindyck (2001) notion of marginal convenience yield
or price of storage. Similarly, if a firm is a unit short, it needs to replenish its stock
next period, which will cost it an expected value of βE(St+1) per unit to acquire,
but the firm would have saved st by not purchasing a unit in this period. Hence, the
unit cost of under stocking is given by
cu = p+ βE(St+1)− St = p+ βft − St
Observe that using the above unit cost of under stocking and overstocking in a
traditional news-vendor problem framework also leads to (3.10).
We assume that sales in the forward market are executed at a risk adjusted
price of ft. This obviates the purpose of buying a unit in the forward market solely
for the cost management purposes in the absence of transaction costs. Thus, in
section 3.3.1 we do not model procurement from the forward market, but in section
3.3.2 we model transaction costs allowing for the procurement in the forward market.
The implementation of this optimal policy is possible because the policy is
myopic in nature, hence we do not need to calculate the stochastic dynamic program
explicitly. However, since ft may not be directly observable, we need to use the
Kalman filter to regress the parameters of the stochastic process (3.1 ) and (3.2) and
use (3.4) to calculate ft. Estimating the cost advantages of using such a policy it is
not simple however; in section 3.4 we will address this issue. The myopic nature of the
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optimal policy is a consequence of the assumption that there are no transaction costs
associated with trading in the spot market. We will relax the no-transaction costs
in the next section; before we do it, however, it is worth discussing the implications
of the marginal convenience yield implied by market price.
Denote by γ = βft − St, the spread between the expected spot price in t+ 1
price and the spot price in t; the equilibrium conditions imply that h ≥ γ, which
ensures that the critical ratio in (3.10) is less than 1; this condition is also equivalent
to ruling out risk free arbitrage opportunities. Similarly, the condition p + γ ≥ 0
can be termed a business rationality condition, which implies that the spot price
is smaller than the sum of penalty cost and the futures price. If this condition is
violated then it would not be profitable for the firm to hold any inventory or to
satisfy any backlog, as it would be more profitable to sell all the stocks in the spot
market and wait for future periods to satisfy the accumulated backlogs.
It is interesting to notice that when γ = 0, the optimal solution described
above reduces to the solution of the standard news-vendor model. However, as γ
increases firms tend to stock more as expected future spot prices increase relative
to the current spot prices. However, a higher market value of marginal convenience
yield δ̂t indicates that current spot prices are relatively higher, elucidating either
increased demand or reduced supply for the commodity. In this case the optimal
stocking policy leads the firm to lower its stocks to reduce cost since overstocking is
more expensive in this period. It is interesting to note that this inverse relationship
between inventory and convenience yield validated empirically by Fama and French
(1988) at the industry level is also valid for each firm pursuing its own individual
profit maximization efforts.
While the “true cost of holding” or marginal convenience yield is determined
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exogenously by the commodity market prices, individual firms can use this informa-
tion to adjust their optimal stocking policies. In other words, a firm can determine
its value of holding an extra unit of inventory given the value of marginal conve-
nience yield of a commodity determined exogenously by the market. Internally for
the firm, each stored unit of the commodity has different value; for example, the first
unit stored by the firm will very likely be used to avert a stockout, hence its value
will be close to penalty cost p, but as more units are stored the value of storing each
additional unit decreases. This model allows for balancing firm specific factors, p,h
and Φ with market driven factors St and ft in obtaining an optimal stocking policy.
If each firm in an industry make stocking decision based on the above described
model then arguably it will lead to a more efficient allocation of inventory across the
industry. In the absence of transaction costs, if for a firm the marginal benefit of a
unit stored is less than the marginal convenience yield then this unit could be sold
to another firm that places higher value on its usage.
3.3.2 Optimal Procurement Policy from a Commodity Market with
Spot and Forward Transaction Costs.
In this section, we consider a supply chain configuration in which the manufacturer
can procure from the spot market, but she can also commit to accepting physical
delivery of the commodity at a future date. In this latter case, we assume that the
contracted price per unit of the commodity is equal to the futures price observed in
the commodity’s market. We assume that goods bought on the spot market incur
higher transportation cost in comparison to the ones bought for future delivery
because they allow the manufacturer less time to arrange for its delivery. Spot
shipping rates often spike up squeezing out the profit margins of firms; however, firms
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who enter into long term shipping contracts are unaffected by the vagaries of shipping
rates in spot transportation markets. These savings in transaction costs represent
an incentive for the manufacturer to commit on the purchase of goods for delivery at
a future date. The model in this section assumes that at each decision period there
are available both, the opportunity to buy the commodity for immediate delivery
from a spot market, as well as the opportunity to buy it with a forward contract
that expires, and it is delivered, at the beginning of the next decision period.
We denote by xt the initial inventory, by zt the inventory level after trading
(buying or selling) in the spot market, and by yt the (echelon) inventory position
after trading in the forward market. Let us denote the transaction cost incurred on
buying and selling a unit in the forward market by αbt and αst respectively, αbst =
αbt + α
s
t . Similarly, we denote the transaction cost incurred on buying and selling in
the spot market as λbt and λst respectively, and assume that αbt < λbt and αst < λst .









(yt − zt)+ − β (ft − αst ) (zt − yt)+, where the first two terms correspond
to the costs associated with purchasing and selling stock in the spot market, and the
last two are the costs associated with purchasing and selling in the forward market.









(yt−zt)+βαbst (zt−yt)+. Let V SFt (xt, χt, ωt) denote the
minimum expected procurement, shortage and storage costs from period t through
period T if we can procure from spot and forward markets; then V SFt (xt, χt, ωt) can
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be written as




















V SFt+1(yt − ξt, χ, ω) φt(ξ) ψt(χ, ω|χt, ωt) dξ dχ dω,
and,
V SFT (xT , χT , ωT ) = (ST + λ
b
T )(−xT )+ − (ST − λsT )(xT )+.
Define the function JSFt (xt, zt, yt) as









+Lt(zt) + λbst (xt − zt)+ + βαbst (zt − yt)+ (3.12)
+βHSFt (yt).
Although JSFt is convex, it can be observed from (3.12), that it is not dif-
ferentiable at zt = xt, and zt = yt, hence we need to rely on its sub-differential for
its optimization. To this end denote as D− and D+ the left and right derivative
respectively, we use D± as a shorthand to denote ‘both the left and right deriva-
tives respectively, and denote the sub-differential of any convex function g at x
with ∂g(x) defined as the set valued function ∂g : x→ [D−x g(x), D+x g(x)]Rockafellar
(1970). Then a sufficient condition for x∗ to minimize g(x) is that 0 ∈ ∂g(x∗). We
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will interpret scalar addition and positive scalar multiplication operations on sub-
differentials and intervals as point-wise operations on each of its elements. Thus








t (z + c)
]
for
any scalars a, b > 0, and c. We also define the indicator function 1{A} as assuming
a value of 1 whenever the logical condition{A} is true and zero otherwise.
Lemma 3.2. Characterization of V SFt and JSFt .
The cost function V SFt is convex in xt, and JSFt is convex in (xt, zt, yt).
Proof: Immediate by induction.
In order to describe in more detail the optimal procurement policy, below we ob-
tain the sub-differentials of JSFt with respect to z and y evaluated at (zt, yt), de-
noted as ∂zJSFt (zt, yt), and ∂yJSFt (zt, yt) respectively. To this end, observe from
(3.11) that D±ytH
SF











t (yt) = H
SF ′
t (yt). First observe that HSF
′
t (yt) is nondecreasing as a conse-
quence of the convexity of V SFt ; it follows from (3.12) that sub-differentials ∂yJSFt (zt, yt)
and ∂zJSFt (zt, yt) can be expressed as
∂yJ
SF
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+ h > 0 as zt → +∞; the positive value of the above limit is guaran-
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teed by the non-negativity of the marginal convenience yield. Theorem 3.2 below
characterizes an integrated forward and spot market optimal procurement policy.
Theorem 3.2. Characterization of Optimal Spot and Forward Procure-
ment Policies.
An optimal forward procurement policy is characterized by two points ybt and yst ,
ybt ≤ yst as follows:
(a) Buy Forward: If zt < ybt , y∗t = ybt ; buy (ybt − zt) units.
(b) Sell Forward: If zt > yst , y∗t = zst ; sell (zt − yst ) units.
(c) Do Nothing: If ybt ≤ zt ≤ yst , y∗t = zt.
An optimal spot market procurement policy in any period t can be characterized by
four spot stocking levels zbt , zcbt , zcst and zst , with zbt ≤ zcbt ≤ zcst ≤ zst , and the two
forward levels ybt and yst , ybt ≤ yst described above. Depending on the initial inventory
level, xt, the optimal spot market procurement policy is described by the following
five cases:

















(f) Do Nothing: If zcbt ≤ xt ≤ zcst then z∗t = xt.
(g) Conditional Sell: If zcst < xt ≤ zst then z∗t = min {xt,max {zcst , yst }}.
(h) Sell Spot: If xt > zst then z∗t = min {zst ,max {zcst , yst }},
and the values of zbt , zcbt , zcst , zst , ybt , and yst are defined as the solutions of the follow-
ing equations:
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Kt(zbt ) = −βαbst , (3.15)
Kt(zcbt ) = 0, (3.16)
Kt(zcst ) = −βαbst + λbst , (3.17)












t ) = α
s
t − ft. (3.20)







t ) and that 0 ∈ ∂yJSt (z∗t , y∗t ) for z∗t , and y∗t as specified by the theo-
rem, and it is included in Appendix A ♦.
Observe that the optimal policy for forward procurement is also of the Criti-






. However, the optimal
spot market procurement policy is a little bit more complex and can be described
as a Regulated Critical Interval since the ends of the interval depend on the forward











,min {zst ,max {zcst , yst }}
]
. Spot procurement pol-
icy hinges on the four critical points defined as zbt , zcbt , zcst and zst . The point zbt
corresponds to a critical level of procurement in spot market conditional that pro-
curement is only made in spot market and not in forward market. The zcbt is the
critical level of procurement conditional that procurement is made both from spot
and forward market. The point zcbt is greater than the point zbt because if the optimal
policy of procurement in spot market is conditional that there is no procurement in
forward market, as characterized by zbt , buying excess stock in spot market can lead
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to selling in forward market costing additional transaction cost. However, if the
optimal procurement policy in spot market is conditional that there is procurement
in forward market, the probability of selling the extra units, which are bought this
period in spot market, in the forward market is very low. This reduced risk of selling
in forward market potentially saves on selling transaction costs in forward market
leading to more procurement in spot market. Similarly, the point zcst corresponds
to the selling point in the spot market when commodity is sold in spot and forward
markets. The point zst corresponds to the selling point in the spot market when
commodity is sold in spot but not in forward market. Similarly, the point zcst is less
than the point zst because if the commodity is to be sold in forward market it reduces
the risk of selling excessively in spot market and later incurring transaction cost to
buy in forward market.
Theorem 3.2(d) postulates that spot procurement is made up to zbt if ybt ≤ zbt .
As ybt increases, the lower limit of the spot procurement interval will start tracking
ybt from zbt up to zcbt , as illustrated in examples (1) through (3) in Figure 3.2(a);
Theorem 3.2(e) suggests that you only buy in spot market if ybt > xt. Theorem
3.2(f) results in no procurement from the spot market since the inventory level is
higher than optimal buying level zcbt , and the inventory level is lower than optimal
selling point zcst . Theorem 3.2(g) suggests that commodity is sold in the spot market
if yst ≤ xt. As yst decreases, the upper limit of the critical interval will track yst
downward starting from zst going down to zcst , as illustrated in examples (4) through
(6) in Figure 3.2(b). Similar, argument follow for Theorem 3.2(i). The optimal
spot market procurement decision consists of buying/selling enough stock to get the
inventory level to the interval, the difference in this case is that the end points of the
interval are regulated by the forward market policy interval. After we have procured
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from the spot market according to the above policy, we will then procure in the
forward market to bring the inventory position from z∗t up or down to the forward
policy critical interval, thus determining y∗t .
Figure 3.2: Optimal Forward and Spot Procurement Policies
Optimal policies characterized in spot and forward market are complex in
nature. Although we characterize the optimal policies, it is difficult to numerically
calculate ybt and yst . Thus, we proceed to obtain lower bound on the cost function
in order to approximate operating policies that are further shown to have a small
optimality gap. If the transaction costs are assumed to be zero then model in Section
3.3.2 reduces to the model in Section 3.3.1, in addition, it leaves with no incentive
to procure in the forward market as risk adjusted futures price is equivalent to spot
price next period.





t and zst can be easily obtained, it is very difficult to calculate ybt and yst
because they depend on HSFt (y). Therefore, we proceed to obtain approximations
on this policy. To this end, we can obtain a lower bound on the cost function V SFt ,
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denoted as VSFt by ignoring the term (βαbst )(zt − yt)+ ≥ 0 in (3.11) resulting on



















zt + Lt(zt) + λbst (xt − zt)+(3.22)












VSFt+1(yt − ξt, χ, ω) φt(ξ) ψt(χ, ω|χt, ωt) dξ dχ dω,
and,
VSFT (xT , χT , ωT ) = V
SF
T (xT , χT , ωT ) = (ST + λ
b
T )(−xT )+ − (ST − λsT )(xT )+. (3.24)
Since the transaction costs of selling excess inventory in the forward market
are ignored to obtain this lower bound on the cost function, the two points yst and ybt
as described in Theorem 3.2 converge to a single point y∗t . In addition, the four points
associated with the spot procurement policy as described in the Theorem 3.2 finally
reduces to only two points given as zcbt and zst . This observations are formalized in
the following theorem.
Theorem 3.3: The optimal procurement policy z∗t , y∗t associated with V
SF
t is char-
acterized by the sequences zcbt , zst and y∗t , with zcbt ≤ zst such that
a) if xt < zcbt , then z∗t = zcbt
b) if zst < xt then z∗t = zst
c) if zcbt ≤ xt ≤ zst then z∗t = xt.
Thereafter, the inventory position is adjusted to y∗t by procuring/selling in the for-
ward market.
Proof: Immediate from Theorem 3.2 by setting αbst = 0♦.
At any period t the points zcbt and zst can be calculated from (3.16) and (3.18)
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respectively. Obtaining y∗t is more involved. First observe from (3.24) that the
optimization of zt has been decoupled from the optimization over yt, hence the
derivatives of HSFt (yt) and H
SF
t+1(yt+1) can be obtained independently from each
other. Specifically, since xt+1 = yt − ξt,
∂
∂yt














J(1)t+1(zt+1, yt − ξ)
}
Even though ∂∂yt H
SF
t (yt) is difficult to compute directly, it is feasible to estimate it
using Monte Carlo simulation as follows. First we compute the loss function Lt+1(z)
which will not change for any (χt, ωt) sample path. Then we simulate a sample path
from (χt, ωt) to (χt+1, ωt+1), and obtain the associated values of zcbt+1 and zst+1. After






t+1, yt−ξ) for a range of values of yt, and repeat this process for different
(χt, ωt) sample paths until we obtain a stable average over the range of interest of yt.
Then the value of y∗t can be estimated by minimizing J
(2)
t (yt) as indicated in (3.24).
Upper Bound on V SFt . An upper bound V̄ SFt on V SFt can be obtained by setting
V̄ SFt (xt, χt, ωt) = J
SF
t (xt, zt, yt) for any values of zt and yt, and JSFt as defined in
(3.12). Thus the values of z∗t and y∗t obtained for the lower bound calculation can
certainly be used on JSFt to obtain also an upper bound; However, the calculation of
y∗t though feasible is time consuming, and we would like to propose an approximation
ȳ∗t that is easier to obtain, and hence easier to implement. To this end, instead of
calculating the expected value of the spot market policy in period t+ 1 we approxi-
mate it with the spot market policy obtained as if St+1 = E [St+1|χt, ωt] = ft . We
can then obtain z̄cbt+1 and z̄st+1 from (3.16) and (3.18) thus defining a spot market
policy z̄t+1 for period t+1 in period t. With this approximate policy for period t+1
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we can proceed to modify (3.25) to estimate the derivative of HSFt (yt) as
∂
∂yt
H̄SFt (yt) = βEξ
∂
∂yt
J(1)t+1(z̄t+1, yt − ξ), (3.26)
and then obtain the value of ȳ∗t by minimizing J
(2)




to approximate ∂∂yt H
SF
t (yt) when calculating the derivative of J
(2)
t (yt). Having ob-
tained ȳ∗t we define the upper bound V̄ SFt (xt, χt, ωt) = JSFt (xt, z∗t , ȳ∗t ) ≥ V SFt (xt, χt, ωt).




In this section we explore the benefits of incorporating marginal convenience yield
information in the derivation of stocking policies over stocking policies that are ob-
tained ignoring this information. The simplest policy we consider for benchmarking
purposes is one that optimizes holding and penalty costs, but ignores the effect of
price changes in the spot market, we term this as static news vendor (SNV) pol-
icy. Under the SNV stocking rule, a firm sets its stocking levels for all subsequent
periods based on the price of commodity observed in the first period. A second,
more elaborate policy that we will call a constant convenience yield (CCY) policy, a
firm has access to commodity prices, but uses the value of the marginal convenience
yield, which is an average over an entire planning horizon. This is equivalent to
assuming a constant convenience yield as assumed by Berling and Rosling (2005).
Then, we evaluate a dynamic convenience yield (DCY) policy, as obtained in Section
3.3.2 DCY policy captures the fluctuations in convenience yield due to fluctuations
in spot and futures prices. For the purposes of comparison we calculate the expected
costs over a 50 period horizon.
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In order to analyze the cost structure better we break the cost into two
categories, uncontrollable and controllable costs. Uncontrollable costs are the ones
that can not be influenced by any stocking policy and are completely dependent on
the path of the stochastic process; controllable costs, on the other hand, are those
affected by stocking policy. For brevity we illustrate the cost breakdown for the
model in Section 3.3.1 only; for this model the cost of a spot price and demand





















We refer to the first three terms respectively as appreciation/depreciation of the
safety stock (ADSS), holding cost, and penalty cost respectively. These first three
terms together comprise controllable cost. The second summation in the above
expression is referred to as the uncontrollable cost. Furthermore, under reasonable
assumptions we can show that the controllable costs are non-negative, and, we will
use them as the basis of comparison of the relative benefits of the DCY model. The
percentage benefits of DCY over CCY policies is given by ∆CY−D, and the benefit
of CCY over SNV policy is given by ∆C−S . These percentages have been calculated
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in the following way. ∆CY−D = ΩCCY −ΩDCYΩCCY −ΩUC × 100, where ΩDCY is the cost under
DCY model, ΩCCY is the cost under the CCY policy, and ΩUC is the uncontrollable
cost. Similarly, ∆C−S = ΩSNV −ΩCCYΩSNV −ΩUC × 100, where ΩSNV is the cost under static
newsboy model’s policy.
We estimate the value function of the dynamic programs in Section 3.4 us-
ing Monte Carlo simulation. For this purpose, we simulate 2000 sample paths of
stochastic price process, and 50 demand paths for each price path, adding up to
a total of 100,000 sample path replications for each set of parameters. Table 3.2
summarizes the set of base case 4and sensitivity parameters used to quantify the
magnitude of the advantage of using the CY model. This is done across ranges of
the following parameters: penalty cost p, coefficient of variation of demand, volatil-
ity of short-term deviations in price σχ, volatility of long term deviation in price σω,
speed of mean reversion k, and coefficient of correlation between the two underlying
Brownian Motion processes, ρ.
4The set of parameters we use as a Base Case are those obtained by Schwartz and Smith (2000)
for oil markets.
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Table 3.2: Stochastic Price Process Parameters
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Table 3.3: Sensitivity Analysis
3.4.1 Procurement Model with No Transaction Costs.
We observe from Table 3.3 that for the Base Case the potential gain from the DCY
model over CCY is 7.52%, on the other hand CCY gains 4.87% over SNV. Benefits
from DCY model over CCY model can go upto 40% depending upon the process
parameters. The potential gains in the CCY and DCY model accrue from the gains
on ADSS. Since stocking levels in CCY and DCY model are less than from that
in SNV model, the holding cost is lower and penalty costs are higher, but due to
the information on marginal convenience yield it is possible to save cost on the
ADSS stock. Thus, the overall benefit on ADSS stock outweighs the increase in the
combined cost of penalty and holding. Effect of p/h Ratio. Increase in the ratio p/h
seems to dissipate the benefit of CY model because higher penalty cost augments
the stocking level, which reduces the opportunity to minimize the cost of ADSS.
Effect of Demand Variability. The increase in demand variance can have a
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twofold impact on the cost structure, on one hand the penalty and holding cost will
increase, and on the other hand savings on ADSS will also increase. However, we ob-
serve that these two effects counterbalance their influence thus, increases in demand
variance does not significantly change the value of DCY model on a percentage basis,
however, the dollar value of the benefit increases. Effect of volatility of short-term
deviations. An increase in volatility of short-term deviations leads to an increase
in penalty and holding costs, but creates an additional opportunity to save cost on
ADSS stocks by adjusting the safety-stock level. Thus, benefits from using DCY
model increases as the volatility in short-term deviation of prices increases. Effect
of volatility of long-term deviations. Increase in fluctuations in long-term deviations
does not manifest a significant change in benefits drawn from DCY model. Effect
of Correlation Coefficient: Greater correlation between two underlying Brownian
motions leads to marginally greater potential benefit from DCY model as a high
correlation coefficient ensures better predictability of futures prices. Effect of Speed
of Mean Reversion : High value of κ leads to higher benefits from the DCY model
because higher κ ensures faster mean reversion in short-term deviations which in
turn lowers the variance in predictability of futures price Schwartz and Smith (2000)
which enhances the benefits from the DCY model. To summarize, the benefits of
DCY policy over CCY policy are considerably high when volatility in short-term
deviation is high and when mean reverting factor is high.
3.4.2 Model with Transaction Cost in Spot and Forward Markets
In spite of incorporating transaction costs in both the spot and forward markets,
we observe a high performance of the sub-optimal policies developed in Section
3.3.2, as implied by the tightness of the bounds on the cost function. The worst
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case observed for the given set of parameters is given by a gap of 1.8% between
lower and upper bound as shown in Table 3.4. Since in this given supply chain
configuration the manufacturer accepts the physical delivery from the supplier (or
from the forward market), he attempts to purchase more from the forward market
availing the opportunity of lower transaction cost in the forward market. In addition,
spot markets are utilized to fine tune the balance of demand and supply by operating
at a relatively higher transaction cost. Table 3.5 shows that procurement in spot
and forward market decreases as the transaction cost increases. Additionally, we
also observe that selling in spot market decreases with increases in the transaction
cost in forward market. This primarily occurs because as buying in forward markets
gets more expensive, it reduces the stocking level from forward market, and thus,
reduces the possibility of carrying excessive inventory into the next period.
Table 3.4: Gap Between Bounds- Spot and Forward Transaction costs
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Table 3.5: Percentage Breakdown of Procurement in Spot and Forward Market
3.5 Managerial Insights
Firms are price takers in the commodity markets, however, the term structure of
the futures price influences the internal cost of operation of a commodity user. The
concept of marginal convenience yield Pindyck (2001) links the term structure of
future price with the effective holding cost of the commodity. In this research,
we illustrate that using the information on marginal convenience yield can lead to
significant reduction in inventory related cost.
The model developed in this chapter has the following contributions: a) we
model stochasticity of prices in a multi-period, periodic review inventory system, b)
we evaluate the procurement policy of a firm in a market paradigm, assimilating
the information on marginal convenience yield in procurement decision making, and
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c) we devise the optimal policy structure of procurement from spot and forward
markets taking into consideration transaction costs. Commodity pricing has been
studied in the literature of finance, whereas, in the operations management litera-
ture, inventory policies have been generally studied ignoring marginal convenience
yield information. We attempted to bridge these two streams of research by ob-
taining operational decisions using commodity market information. We characterize
optimal procurement policies, develop bounds and approximations to facilitate its
implementation, and quantify the tightness of the bounds. Furthermore, we postu-
late that for optimal decision making a firm should balance its marginal profit of
storing each additional unit with the marginal convenience yield determined exoge-
nously by the spread between spot and futures market prices. If a firm’s marginal
profit for an additional unit is lower than the market marginal convenience yield,
then the firm is better off selling that unit in the market, as some other user of that
unit is willing to pay more than the value the firm places on this unit. Moreover,
these trading decisions are mediated by transaction costs derived from the logistics
of interacting with these markets.
Futures markets have been traditionally used for risk-hedging purposes, how-
ever, we show that information on futures prices can have additional advantages
other than risk-management. Information on futures prices can be used by a com-
modity user to fine tune its stocking policies in order to minimize its inventory related
costs. Our results illustrate that commodity markets provide flexibility in procure-
ment to fine tune stocking levels, but they also highlight that another important
benefit of commodity markets is the spot and futures price information that they




Policies in a Distributive Supply
Chain
4.1 Introduction
In the recent past there has been an upsurge in the trading of industrial commodi-
ties on established commodity exchanges. NYBOT and CBOT started trading long
term futures contracts for ethanol in the year 2005. Also, NYBOT recently intro-
duced futures and option contracts on wood pulp. London Metal Exchange (LME)
started trading futures contracts on plastics, and is deliberating to start trading
futures contracts on steel. Although commodities have been traded on organized
markets for centuries now, the above cited examples refer to industrial commodities
which highlights the recent surge in significance of commodity markets in manufac-
turing sector of the economy. Commodity markets provide information about price
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trends through prices of futures, and although the potential use of futures contracts
for hedging purposes has been well established, the impact of price information on
procurement and distribution policies in a supply chain is not well understood. Sig-
nificantly, this research explores how the price information generated by commodity
markets can be utilized by commodity users and commodity processors to improve
their internal decision making.
This paper investigates the effect of fluctuating prices of commodities as
dictated by commodity markets on procurement and distribution policies in a supply
chain. The spread between spot and futures prices as dictated by markets determine
the actual cost of holding a commodity, often referred in the economics literature as
the cost of carry Working (1949) and Williams and Wright (1991). The objective
of this research is to ascertain efficient procurement and distribution policies when
markets are exogenously imposing the cost of holding on a firm. In this context, it
becomes important to understand how a firm should adjust its operating policies in
response to the dynamically changing commodity prices. In general, commodities,
such as gasoline which is the motivation for this paper, are distributed through multi-
echelon inventory distribution systems. In this research, we seek to explore the role
of commodity markets on the procurement and distribution policies of commodities
in a two-echelon distribution network.
In general, the spot price of a commodity reflects the existing dynamics of
supply and demand in the market, whereas futures prices reflect the anticipated
demand and supply equilibrium in the future. Moreover, the information generated
by the futures markets can also be useful in negotiating forward1 contracts between
1Forward contract is a customized non-transferable agreement between buyer and seller, and are
settled through physical delivery. Futures contracts, on the other hand, are standardized contracts
that are settled by financially offsetting an existing position (long or short), and are commonly used
for risk hedging purposes.
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buyers and suppliers of the commodity since the future price dictated by the market
contains more information on demand/supply dynamics than the information held
by individual buyers and suppliers. The objective of this paper is to understand how
this price information generated by commodity markets can be utilized to enhance
the efficacy of the supply chain through better procurement and distribution policies.
In particular, we aspire to understand how the operational efficiency of a supply chain
can be enhanced by reflecting the market generated true cost of storage on supply
chain procurement and distribution decisions. The main motivation for this paper
is the distribution process of gasoline in a vertically integrated oil company.
The supply chain of gasoline is a very complex network that distributes
around 9 million barrels per day across 167,893 retail gas stations spread across
the country. Distribution of gasoline starts from a refinery where crude oil is refined
into gasoline and other products, gasoline is then shipped through a network of
pipelines to various terminals (that act as distribution locations), where it is loaded
on tanker trucks and shipped to the network of retailers. These terminals house stor-
age facilities, where additives are added to gasoline according to the requirements of
the various different brands as well as local regulations. There are two types of retail
stations, those supplied directly by the refiner, and those that are supplied by inde-
pendent wholesalers who act as intermediaries between the refiners and independent
retailers. Directly supplied gas stations sell branded gasoline and operate under the
following three different types of supply contracts: (a) stations that are owned and
operated by the refiner, (b) stations that are owned by the refiner, but leased to an
operator who manages it and has the ability to set retail prices, and (c) stations that
are independently owned, and the owner has signed an agreement with the oil com-
pany to sell its brand of gas Hastings (2004). Gas stations that are independently
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supplied can be subdivided into those who sell branded or unbranded gasoline; they
procure gasoline from jobbers operating at the terminal. Jobbers are wholesalers
who buy gasoline from the terminal and distribute unbranded or branded gasoline
to the retail network downstream. In our research, we focus on the procurement of
gasoline at the terminal and the direct distribution of gasoline to the branded retail-
ers. In general, all three types of directly supplied branded retailers operate under
Vendor Management Inventory (VMI) policies, therefore, from a cost management
perspective this system can be treated as a vertically integrated channel. The VMI
system has been successfully implemented with the help of advancements in informa-
tion technology; for instance, gas tanks buried under the gas station have electronic
sensors that convey the inventory level to a procurement management team at the
terminal, where logistical arrangements are made to efficiently deliver gasoline to
each specific retail station Worthen (2002)
Gasoline at the terminal can be procured internally, through forward con-
tracts and through spot purchases. In the wake of supply disruptions or spikes in
consumer demand, inventory at the terminal may fall below desirable levels forc-
ing terminal mangers to procure gasoline from the spot market. For instance when
Phillips Petroleum ran out of gasoline at its Phoenix terminal (Barrionuevo, 2002), it
temporarily closed many retail gas stations resulting in large penalty costs and high
procurement costs from spot markets. According to CIO magazine Worthen (2002),
up to 30% of the gasoline supply at Chevron is obtained through spot market pur-
chases. Thus, from the interest of an operations manager some pertinent questions
include 1) how much gas should be procured through spot and forward transactions
at the terminal 2) what should be the distribution policy to the retailers, and 3)
what is the effect on system performance of using the information generated from
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the price observed in commodity markets to formulate the above two procurement
and distribution policies. These are the questions we seek to address in this re-
search using a two echelon inventory model where the upper echelon in the model is
analogous to the terminal.
The distribution network consists of multiple non-homogeneous retailers ful-
filling random demands using a periodic review demand replenishment system. The
central procurement facility, a gasoline terminal, can procure the commodity from
the spot market with immediate delivery, as well as from the forward market with a
delivery lag of one period. The transportation costs associated with the procurement
from spot and forward markets have also been modeled. We assume that the demand
process and commodity price process are independent from each other. This assump-
tion is justified in our example as the demand for gasoline is relatively inelastic in
the short term for moderate variations in price. We also assume that commodity
prices follow a stochastic process that offers no risk-free arbitrage opportunities.
4.2 Serial Echelon Model
There is a range of possible models that represent the distribution of gasoline. On
one end of spectrum there is a case where retailers may be identical in their penalty
costs and have a stationary demand distribution. However, on the other end of
the spectrum is the case where each retailer may face a different penalty costs due
to stock outs and non-stationary demand distribution. In a scenario where retailers
have identical penalty costs and stationary demand distribution, it has been shown by
Federgruen and Zipkin (1984) that all retailers can be aggregated into one entity, and
then a critical fractile allocation policy can be optimally obtained for this combined
entity. This derived critical fractile can be used to determine the stocking levels at
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each retailer. In this section, we assume that retailers have identical penalty cost and
stationary demand distribution. This section develops a methodology to obtain a
characterization of the optimal solution when commodity prices are fluctuating and
there is an additional possibility of procurement from the spot market. In Section
4.3 we develop a solution methodology for the case where retailers are non identical
and demand is non-stationary.
This model addresses a two echelon inventory system in which a single commodity
is procured at the higher echelon either through spot market or through forward
contract transactions, and then this commodity is shipped to the lower echelon as
shown in Figure 4.1. Specifically, in our model it means that the gasoline is pro-
cured centrally at the terminal through spot and forward market transactions and,
thereafter, shipped to the retailer. Since gasoline is reformulated at the terminal,
it is not economical to re-sell it in the commodity market; therefore, this system
summarizes a make-to-stock manufacturing system, which implies that commodity
once bought from the market and reformulated can not be resold in the commodity
market. The commodity bought from the forward market arrives with a lead time
of one period while spot procurement has a zero lead time. In particular, both spot
and forward procurement decisions are made before the demand in the period is
realized. Moreover, the transaction cost from the forward procurement αt is consid-
ered to be lower than the spot transaction cost ηt because in spot trade the goods
have to be transported with a short notice and this usually results in a higher cost
of transportation. In addition, we consider a zero lead time in shipping of gasoline
from the terminal to the the retailer at a transportation cost of γt. This system
operates under periodic review system, where unsatisfied demand at the retailer is
completely backlogged. The cost of each unit of unsatisfied demand is pt in period
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t , and the cost of storage is ht per unit in period t. We denote ξ by the random
demand , and φt(ξ) its probability density function.
Figure 4.1: Serial Multi-Echelon Distribution System
The state of the system can be represented as follows, wt denotes the inventory
level at the retailer, and the echelon inventory at the terminal is denoted by xt. The
price of the commodity in period t is determined by the realization of χt and ωt as
described in Section 3.2.3, where St = exp(χt + ωt). At the start of each period
three stocking decisions are made; first, the procurement decision from the forward
market is made, we denote the inventory position as yt which represents the echelon
stock; second the spot procurement decision is made, we denote inventory level after
spot transactions as zt; finally, after procurement decisions are made, the allocation
of inventory to the lower echelon is decided, we denote vt as the inventory position
at the retailer. Stocking levels at the terminal are modeled as echelon stocks with
the inventory position obtained from the forward contract yt considered to be higher
than or equal to the inventory position obtained after procurement from spot market
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ht(vt − ξt)φt(ξ) dξ +
∫ ∞
vt
pt(ξ − vt)φt(ξ) dξ
The overall objective of the firm is to minimize the following cost function, which is
modeled as a stochastic dynamic program whose state space is represented by short
term deviation factor χt, long-term deviations factor ωt, the initial echelon inventory
at the terminal xt, and initial inventory at the retailer given as wt.
Jt(χt, ωt, yt, zt, vt, xt, wt) = (St + ηt)(zt − xt) + (βft + αt)(yt − zt) (4.1)
+ht(zt − xt) + γt(vt − wt) + L(vt) +
βEχ,ω|χt,ωtEξVt+1(χ, ω, yt − ξt, vt − ξt) (4.2)
Vt(χt, ωtxt, wt) = min
yt,zt,vt
{
Jt(χt, ωt, yt, zt, vt, xt, wt)
}
(4.3)
where, ln(St) = χt + ωt
s.t yt ≥ zt ≥ xt; zt ≥ vt ≥ wt;
and,
VT (χT , ωT , xT , wT ) = −(ST + ηT )(−xT )+ + (ST − ηT )(xT )+
The functions Jt and Vt are a function of χt and ωt, however, for notational
simplicity we will omit this for the remainder of paper. The first term in (4.1)
represents spot procurement costs, the second term denotes forward procurement
cost, the third term accounts for holding cost on the upper echelon, the fourth term
captures the transportation cost from the upper echelon to the lower echelon, the fifth
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term is the loss function, and the sixth term represents the cost to go function. At the
end of the horizon, backlogged demand is fulfilled from spot market purchases, and
excess stock is salvaged by selling it on the spot market. We consider a transaction
cost of ηT per unit for selling stocks in the spot market in the last period. In what
follows, we show that the methodology of Clark and Scarf (1960) in conjunction with
the results proposed by Karush (1958) leads to the decomposition of multi-echelon
problem in the above presented framework. The following lemma elucidates the
results of Karush in more detail. In what follows, we denote min{a, b} = a∧b, and
max{a, b} = a ∨ b.
Lemma 4.1: Karush: If a function f is convex on R, and x ≤ y, then minx≤θ≤yf(θ)
= f(θ∗)+H(x)+G(y), where a is constant, H is convex increasing and G is convex
decreasing such that
H(x) = f(x ∨ θ∗)− f(θ∗), and
G(y) = f(y ∧ θ∗) − f(θ∗), where θ∗is the unconstrained minimum of the function
f(θ).
Theorem 4.1: Convexity and Separability of Vt
The cost function Vt(xt, wt) is convex in (xt, wt), and can be decomposed as Vt(xt, wt) =
V 1t (wt) + V
2
t (xt), where V 1t (wt) is convex in wt and V 2t (xt) is convex in xt.
Proof: We observe that V 2T (xT ) = (ST + ηT )(−xT )+ − (ST − ηT )(xT )+, and
V 1T (wT ) = 0, and proceed using backward induction.
Thus, by the induction hypothesis we assume that Vt+1(xt+1, wt+1) = V 2t+1(xt+1) +
V 1t+1(wt+1)
We define, Jt(yt, zt, xt, vt, wt) = J1t (vt)+J2t (zt)+J3t (yt)− (St +ηt)xt−htxt−
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γtwt, where
J1t (vt) = Lt(vt) + γtvt + βEξV
1
t+1(vt − ξt) (4.4)
J2t (zt) = (St + ηt + ht − βft − αt)zt (4.5)
J3t (yt) = (βft + αt)yt + βEχ,ω|χt,ωtEξV
2
t+1(y − ξt) (4.6)
We observe that all of the above functions are convex or linear, thus, we can write
Vt(xt, wt) = min
xt≤zt≤yt;wt≤vt≤zt
Jt(yt, zt, xt, vt, wt) = min
yt≥xt
{








− (St + ηt)xt − γtwt
Applying Lemma 4.1 on the constrained minimization of J1t (vt) gives us J1t (v
∗u
t ) +
H1t (wt) + G
1
t (zt), a constant term, convex function of wt, and a convex function of
zt, where v∗ut is the unconstrained minimum of function J1t (vt), and G1t (zt)=J1t (zt ∧
v∗ut )− J1t (v
∗u
t ),which refers to the imputed cost to the upper echelon if the manager
at upper echelon supplies downstream a lower quantity than what it is optimal from
the perspective of the lower echelon. In addition, H1t (wt) = J1t (wt ∨ v∗ut )− J1t (v
∗u
t ),
which refers to the cost lower echelon has to incur for carrying excess inventory where
wt > v
∗u
t . Furthermore, we can define V 1t (wt) = H1t (wt) − γtwt Thus (4.3) can be
written as














t ) + V
1
t (wt)− (St + ηt)xt
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where,





Furthermore, applying Lemma 4.1 on the constrained minimization of K2t (zt), gives
K2t (z
∗u
t ) + H
2
t (xt) + G
2
t (yt), where z∗ut is the unconstrained minimum of function
K2t (zt), and G2t (yt)=K2t (yt ∧ z∗ut )−K2t (z
∗u
t ), which refers to the imputed cost to the
manager responsible for forward procurement if the manager of forward procurement
makes a decision that allows for less spot procurement than what is optimal from the
perspective of the manager responsible for spot procurement. In addition, H2t (xt) =
K2t (xt ∨ z∗ut ) −K2t (z
∗u
t ), which refers to the excess cost incurred by upper echelon
for holding excess echelon inventory at the upper echelon. Also, we define Ĥ2t (xt) =
H2t (xt)− (St + ηt)xt
Thus (4.3) can be written as,

















K3t (yt) = G
2
t (yt) + J
3
t (yt)
Applying Lemma 4.1 on the constrained minimization of K3t (yt), gives us K3t (y∗ut )+
H3t (xt), where y∗ut is the unconstrained minimum of function K3t (yt), and, H3t (xt) =
K3t (xt ∨ y∗ut ) −K3t (y
∗u
t ), which refers to the excess cost incurred by upper echelon
for holding excess echelon inventory at the upper echelon.














t (xt) + Ĥ2t (xt)
}
, we get




Corollary4. 1: The above theorem implies that the top-down base stock
policy is optimal. If the decision making process in the above centralized model
follows a hierarchy, then the policy that considers the decisions from the upstream
manager as inviolable and accommodates the requirements of the downstream man-
ager accordingly is considered to be optimal. The hierarchy in the model is such that
the manager who deals with the procurement at the lower echelon is at the bottom
of the hierarchy, following the manager who is responsible for the procurement from
the spot market, following the manager who procures gasolines from the forward
market. This policy follows the traditional framework of base-stock policy such that
y∗ut is the base stock level of procurement from the forward market, z∗ut is the base
stock level for procurement from the spot market, and v∗ut is the base stock level at
the lower echelon. The optimal decision of procurement from the forward market
is given by y∗t = y∗ut ∨ xt, similarly, the optimal decision of stocking from the spot
market z∗t is given as z∗t = (y∗ut ∧ z∗ut ) ∨ xt, and the allocation to the lower echelon
is given by v∗t = (z∗ut ∧ v∗ut ) ∨ wt.
It is important to notice that marginal convenience yield, as defined above
should be positive, δt ≥ 0. If the marginal convenience yield were negative then it
would create an opportunity for risk free arbitrage. Negative marginal convenience
yield entails that a firm can procure a commodity in a spot market at spot price
St,contract storage from t to t + 1 paying h, and sell a forward contract at ft,
generating a cash flow with a present value of βft, thus, making a positive profit on
such transaction. In equilibrium, such phenomenon would not exist as every firm will
start short selling commodity, which will increase the spot price and drive marginal
convenience yield into positive territory.
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Lemma 4.2: Characterization of Optimal Spot Procurement Policies
The base stock procurement level at the lower echelon is larger than or equal to the
base stock procurement level from the spot market at the upper echelon, v∗ut ≥ z∗ut .
Proof: The marginal convenience yield δt, is defined as δt = St + ht − βft . From
(4.7) we observe that the function K2t (zt) is downward sloping with its slope equal
to zero at z∗ut ≥ v∗ut , where v∗ut and z∗ut are the unconstrained minimizer for the
functions J1t (vt) and K2t (zt) respectively. The linear term in (4.7) has a positive
slope of δt + ηt − αt , thus optimal z∗ut ≤ v∗ut .♦
The intuition behind the above lemma is that since the manager at the lower echelon
is not considering cost to purchase inventory he tends to order a sufficiently large
quantity, however, the manager responsible for procurement from the spot market
tends to order less because in addition to all the costs taken into account by the
lower echelon manger he also needs to consider the cost of acquiring the inventory,
and hence the convenience yield and transportation costs, which forces him to order
relatively smaller quantity than what is desired at the lower echelon. Thus, the
lower echelon manager is willing to offer higher service level than what is optimal
from the perspective of the supply chain. Another implication of this Lemma is
that whenever we procure from the spot market, any inventory acquired will be
immediately shipped to the lower echelon.
4.2.1 Myopic Policy
In this section, we characterize the myopic policies for the two echelon inventory
system described in the previous section. We develop conditions according to which
the myopic policies obtained are shown to be optimal.
Theorem 4.2: Optimality of Myopic Policies
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For stationary demand and constant marginal convenience yield a myopic policy is
optimal.
Proof : The function J1t (vt) given in (4.4) can be computed myopically given that
the constraint vt ≥ wt never binds, thus, H1t (wt) equals zero and it is possible
to calculate J1t (vt) myopically. This can be shown to be true also for the case of
non-decreasing demand. Notice, that the constraint zt ≥ vt is not a hindrance in
obtaining a myopic optimal policy as it does not have any consequence for cost to go,
however, the penalty cost for violating this constraint gets folded in the cost of upper
echelon. Similarly, analyzing the function K2t (zt) we could infer that it is easy to
calculate this function myopically as there are no implications of cost to go. Thus,
function G2t (yt) can also be computed myopically, in addition, if we assume that
the demand is stationary, and the marginal convenience yield is constant over time
periods then the function K3t (yt) can also be computed myopically. The assumption
of y∗t ≥ xt in all time periods leads to H3t (xt) = 0, thus the function of cost to go
V 2t+1(xt+1) is defined in terms of constants and the function Ĥ2t (xt+1), which, as
shown previously, can be computed myopically for a constant marginal convenience
yield, thus the function of cost to go can be computed myopically making it possible
to compute the function K3t (yt) myopically. For stationary case y∗t ≥ y∗t−1 − ξt−1 ,
ensures that the myopic solution is optimal.♦
The serial multi-echelon model allows us to obtain an optimal solution and conditions
in which myopic policy is optimal. After developing insights from the basic model
we extend the model to the multiple retailer case in the following section.
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4.3 Multiple Retailers Model
In this Section, we define in detail the procurement and distribution model in Section
4.3.1; Characterization of procurement policies from spot and forward market are
developed in Section 4.3.2.
4.3.1 Mathematical Model
This model addresses a two echelon inventory system in which a single commodity
is procured at the higher echelon either through spot market or through forward
contract transactions, and then this commodity is shipped to the lower echelon
as shown in Figure 4.2. Specifically, in our model it means that the gasoline is
procured centrally at the terminal through spot and forward market transactions
and, thereafter, shipped to the retailers downstream. Since gasoline is reformulated
at the terminal, it is not economical to re-sell it in the commodity market; therefore,
this system summarizes a make-to-stock manufacturing system, which implies that
commodity once bought from the market and reformulated can not be resold in the
commodity market. The commodity bought from the forward market arrives with a
lead time of one period while spot procurement has a zero lead time. In particular,
both spot and forward procurement decisions are made before the demand in the
period is realized. Moreover, the transaction cost from the forward procurement αt
is considered to be lower than the spot transaction cost ηt because in spot trade
the goods have to be transported with a short notice and this usually results in a
higher cost of transportation. In addition, we consider a zero lead time in shipping
of gasoline from the terminal to the the retailer i at a transportation cost of γit . This
system operates under periodic review system, where unsatisfied demand at the
retailer is completely backlogged. There are N non-homogeneous retailers, which
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differ on their demand distribution and penalty costs. The cost of each unit of
unsatisfied demand is pit in period t for retailer i, and the cost of holding stock at
retailer i costs hit per unit in period t, and ht is per unit holding cost of commodity
in period t at the upper echelon. The vector of demand realizations at each retailer
in period t, is denoted as ~ξt where each realization of demand for retailer i is drawn
from the normal distribution given by φit(ξ). We denote the aggregate demand of





Figure 4.2: Multi-Location Distribution System
The state of the system can be represented as follows, wi denotes the inven-
tory level at retailer i; w̃ represents the vector of inventory levels at all the retailers,
and the echelon inventory at the warehouse is denoted by x. The allocation of in-
ventory to respective retailers is denoted by vi where i = 1, 2..N , and vi denotes the






i − ξit)φit(ξ) dξ +
∫ ∞
vi
pit(ξ − vi)φt(ξ) dξ
The overall objective of the firm is to minimize the cost function V Dt (x, w̃), which
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is modeled as a stochastic dynamic program whose state space are represented by
short term deviation factor χt, long-term equilibrium factor ωt, the initial echelon
inventory at the terminal x, and the vector of initial inventory is at the retailers ~w.
We omit χt and ωt from the state space in order to simplify the notation.
V Dt (x, w̃) = min





wi ≤ vi; y ≥ 0



















t+1(y − ζt, ~v − ~ξt)
(4.8)
and,
VT+1(x, w̃) = (ST+1 + ηT+1)(−x)+ − (S − ηT+1)(x)+
























and, ln(St) = χt + ωt. For notational simplicity we omit time subscripts from
state and decision variables when doing so results in no ambiguity. We denote
EPΨ(χ, ω) = Eχ,ω|χt,ωtΨ(χ, ω), where the expectation is taken under the historic
probability measure of the price stochastic process conditional on χt and ωt. The
first term in the cost function (4.8) is the cost of procurement from the spot market;
second term represents the cost of procurement through forward contract; third term
is the holding cost of stock at the upper echelon; the fourth term is the aggregate
cost of transportation of the commodity from the terminal to the respective retailers;
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the fifth term is the loss function at retailers; the sixth term is the discounted cost
to go in the future period. Constraint y ≥ 0 ensures that backlogs are not carried




i ensures that the inventory position at upper echelon after
spot purchases is higher than the combined inventory position at lower echelon.
The constraint vi ≥ wi implies that only positive amount of inventory is shipped
to the retailers, thus, not allowing for any balancing of inventory through “lateral”
transshipments.
To Simplify the discussion below we introduce the operator Ht. Let f be a function
f : RN+1 → R, then Ht[f ] is defined as follows












i) + βEQEζtf(y − ζt, ~v − ~ξt)
Clearly Ht[f ] is a function of (x, y, z, w̃, ṽ) as indicated above. However, for nota-
tional simplicity we will write it as Ht[f ]. Using this notation, we can define V Dt
as
V Dt (x, w̃) = min
x ≤ z ≤ y
y ≥ 0




Lemma 4.3: Isotonicity of Ht
If f : RN+1 → R and g : RN+1 → R are such that f ≤ g point-wise, then Ht[f ] ≤
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Ht[g]
Proof: Immediate from f(y− ζt, ~v− ~ξt) ≤ g(y− ζt, ~v− ~ξt) and from the observation
that the probability distributions in the calculation of EQ and Eζ are non-negative.
Lemma 4.4: Preservation of Convexity
If f : RN+1 → R is a convex function, then Ht[f ] is convex in (x, y, z, ~v, ~w)
Proof: Since f is a convex function f(y − ζt, ~v − ~ξt) is convex in (y, ~v)for every
demand outcome ξ̃t, and every price factor outcome (χt+1, ωt+1). Since all probabil-
ities are non-negative EQEζtf(y − ζt, ~v − ~ξt) is convex in (y, ~v) for every (ωt, χt).
The result follows since the rest of the terms in the definition of Ht are convex.♦
Lemma 4.5: Convexity of V Dt :
The function V Dt is convex in (x, w̃) for every (ωt, χt)
Proof: Using backward induction assume that V Dt+1 is convex in (x, w̃). This as-
sumption can easily be verified for V DT+1. Moreover, if V
D
t+1 is convex, it follows from
Lemma 4.2 that Ht[V Dt+1] is convex in (x, y, z, w̃, ṽ) for every (ωt, χt), and since the
minimization in (4.10) is taken over a convex set, it follows that Vt is convex in
(x, w̃)♦.
4.3.2 Characterization of Procurement Policies
This subsection develops insights on procurement policies from spot and forward
markets. In this regards, we obtain a set of first order conditions where equations
(4.11), (4.12) and (4.13) represents first order condition for decision variables, z,y,
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and vi respectively,
St + h− βft + ηt − αt − λ− µ+ π = 0 (4.11)
βft + βαt + βD+y [E
QEζtV
D
t+1(y − ζt, ~v − ~ξt)]− π = 0 (4.12)
λ+ γi +D+
vi
[Lt(vi)]− ki + βD+vi [E
QEζtV
D
t+1(y − ζt, ~v − ~ξt)] = 0 (4.13)




vi) = 0 (4.15)
π(y − z) = 0 (4.16)
ki(vi − wi) = 0 (4.17)
where, µ, λ, π, and ki are Lagrangian multipliers associated with constraints z ≥ x,
z ≥ r, y ≥ z, and vi ≥ wi respectively. The optimal solution should satisfy the
above set of equations, and as a result, we can observe the following properties on
optimal procurement policies. Let z∗and y∗ denote the optimal echelon inventory
after procurement from spot and forward market respectively.
Property 1: if y∗ > z∗ > x then π = 0 , µ = 0 and λ = St + ht − βft + ηt − αt.
This property follows from (4.11), (4.14), and (4.16), and it implies that when it is
optimal to procure from both spot and forward markets, the value of the Lagrange
multiplier λ associated with the allocation constraint (4.15) is given by the conve-
nience yield, implied by the commodity markets, adjusted by the transaction cost
differential ηt−αt. We will denote this adjusted convenience yield as δ̂t = δt+ηt−αt.
Property 2: if y∗ > z∗ = x then π = 0, µ ≥ 0, and λ ≤ δ̂t
This property states that if there is a positive procurement from the forward market
but it is not optimal to procure from the spot market then (4.14) implies that µ ≥ 0,
and (4.16) implies π = 0. Hence it follows from (4.11) that λ ≤ δ̂t.
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Property 3: If y∗ > z∗,then λ and µ cannot both be equal to zero
Since, δ̂t > 0, and y∗ > z∗ implies π = 0, it follows from (4.11) that λ+ µ > 0. We
can examine two cases emanating from this property: a) If µ = 0, which occurs when
there is a spot market procurement, then it must also satisfy λ > 0. In this case
(4.15) implies that z =
∑N
i=1 v
i, showing that whenever we procure from the spot
market, all stocks at the upper echelon must be fully allocated to the downstream
retailers; there is no physical inventory at the upper echelon. (b) if λ = 0, which will
happen when there is physical inventory at the upper echelon as implied by (4.15),
we must have µ > 0. In this case (4.14) implies it is not optimal to procure from the
spot market z∗ = x. This is the converse of the implication of case (a), namely, if
an optimal policy does not allocate the echelon inventory fully to the downstream
retailers, then it must not procure from the spot market.
Since the transaction cost adjusted convenience yield is positive, δ̂t > 0 we
can expect under common operating conditions some degree of forward procurement,
y∗ > z∗. However, it is also conceivable that an optimal policy prescribes no forward
procurement, y∗ = z∗; this may happen, for example, in anticipation of a downturn
in demand for subsequent periods. Properties 4 and 5 are related to this particular
case.
Property 4: If y∗ = z∗ > x then µ = 0, π ≥ 0, and λ > δ̂t
This property highlights that if an optimal policy suggests no procurement from the
forward market but there is a procurement from the spot market then (4.16) implies
π ≥ 0, and (4.14) implies µ = 0. Hence it follows from (4.11) that λ > δ̂t.
Property 5: if y∗ = z∗ = x then λ ≥ 0, π ≥ 0, and µ ≥ 0
In this case, when there is no procurement of either kind then nothing specific can
be said about the value of λ
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In the literature on one-warehouse multi-retailer, researchers have dealt with
the allocation constraint by dualizing it, and devising methods to obtain the value
of the dual variable through the internal characteristics of the network. However,
in our model, we have the flexibility of instantaneous procurement from the spot
market; therefore, the commodity market equilibrium influences the value of the
dual variable of the allocation constraint,λ, or it provides bounds as described in
the properties above. Notice that from this model the value of the dual variable can
be determined without making a balancing assumption. One of the contributions
of our model is to propose a method to obtain the cost of relaxing the allocation
constraint through market equilibrium in conjunction with the internal parameters
of network instead of exclusively relying on internal parameters of the network as
has been the solution methodology in the literature. This shall enable us to obtain
better procurement and distribution policies for traded commodities, which shall
allow us to manage gasoline distribution operation more efficiently.
4.4 Lagrangian Relaxation Approach
As the number of retailers increases in the network the state space of the problem
increases, and due to the curse of dimensionality it is very difficult to obtain an
optimal solution to this problem, therefore, we proceed to develop bounds on the
cost function. In this regard, we follow the Lagrangian relaxation approach. In
section 4.4.1 we formulate the Lagrangian relaxation model and show that it can
be decomposed into a sum of N + 1 simpler dynamic programs. In section 4.4.2
we develop a lower bound for the Lagrangian relaxation model and in section 4.4.3
we discuss a limited look-ahead approach to obtain approximate solutions to this




The mathematical model described below belongs to the family of weakly coupled
dynamic programs, where several dynamic programs are linked together through
a common constraint. In our model the allocation constraint couples individual
dynamic programs associated with the decisions of each retailer with the overall
dynamic program of the system. We will attempt to decouple it by dualizing the
allocation constraint so that conditional on the value of the multiplier it is feasible
to have a solution for the problem by solving the individual dynamic programs
in order to achieve bounds on the cost function of the original problem. For a
more complete discussion on weakly coupled dynamic programs we refer readers to
Adelman and Mersereau (2004) and Caro and Gallien (2007). We next proceed to




t for all the periods. Here we make an assumption
that the value of Lagrange multiplier will be fixed at λ for all subsequent periods.
Thus, the objective function can be written as
V λt (xt, w̃t) = min
x ≤ z ≤ y
y ≥ 0
wi ≤ vi
Hλt [V λt+1] (4.18)
where,
V λT+1(xT+1, ˜wT+1) = (ST+1 + ηT+1)(−xT+1)+ − (ST+1 − ηT+1)(xT+1)+
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and the operator Hλt is defined as




for any scalar λ ≥ 0. It is clear that Hλt is also isotonic and preserves convexity as
established in Lemma 4.1 and Lemma 4.2 for Ht.
Theorem 4.2: Lower Bound on V Dt
The Lagrangian relaxation V λt is a lower bound on V Dt for any non-negative value
of the parameter λ
Proof: We proceed by induction by assuming V λt+1 ≤ V Dt+1. It can be verified that
this assumption is true in period T + 1. Then we can observe that
V λt = min
x ≤ z ≤ y
y ≥ 0
wi ≤ vi
Hλt [V λt+1] ≤ min
x ≤ z ≤ y
y ≥ 0
wi ≤ vi
Hλt [V Dt+1] ≤ (4.19)
≤ min







Ht[V Dt+1] = V Dt
The first inequality follows since Hλt [V λt+1] ≤ Hλt [V Dt+1] point-wise as Hλt is
isotonic (Lemma 3). The second inequality follows from the definition of Hλt as the
program in the left is a relaxation of the program in the right and V Dt+1 is independent
of λ.
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Theorem 4.3: Decoupling of V λt




i;λ), where ht is convex in x and git is convex in wi for all i and for any
value of λ
Proof: The validity of the theorem for time T + 1 is immediate from (4.18) by
setting hT+1(x;λ) = (ST+1 +ηT+1)(−x)+− (ST+1−ηT+1)(x)+, and giT+1(w;λ) = 0,
for all i . We proceed inductively by assuming that Theorem 4.3 holds for time t+1,





i;λ). Hence, (4.18) can be defined as











J1t (z;λ) = (St + ht − βft + ηt − αt − λ)zt (4.21)
J2t (y;λ) = β(ft + αt)yt + βE









t + λ− ht)vit + βEζtgit+1(vit − ξit;λ) (4.23)
It follows from the induction hypothesis that J2t (y;λ)is convex in yt , J1t (z : λ)
is convex in z, and the functions f it are convex in vi for all values of λ. Hence,
Hλt [V λt+1] is convex in (x, y, z, ṽ, w̃). Now we can write equation (4.18) as
V λt (x, w̃) = min
z≥x
{


















It follows from Lemma 4.1 that J2t (y;λ) = J2t (y∗;λ) +H2t (z;λ)
H2t (z;λ) = J
2
t (y ∨ z;λ)− J2t (yu;λ) (4.24)
where, yu is the unconstrained minimizer of J2t (y;λ). The function H2t (z;λ)
is convex and non decreasing. Now we can write equation (4.18) as



















It follows from Lemma 4.1 that min
z ≥ x
K1t (z;λ) = K
1
t (z
u;λ) +H1t (x;λ), where
H1t (x;λ) = K
1
t (z ∨ x;λ)−K1t (zu;λ) (4.26)
where zu is the unconstrained minimizer of function K1t (z;λ); the function H1t (z;λ)
is convex and nondecreasing. We define
ht(x;λ) = K1t (z












i;λ), and V λt is convex in (x, w̃)♦.
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Theorem 4.3 elucidates that it is possible to decouple the larger dynamic program
for the entire system into various smaller dynamic programs one for each terminal
and one for the upper echelon. As a result, the complexity of the problem increases
linearly with the number of downstream retailers N. These sub programs are rep-
resented as a function of the Lagrange multiplier λ applied in the relaxation of the
allocation constraint.
Lemma 4.6: Characterization of procurement policy as implied by Vλt
Procurement policy from spot and forward markets are base stock policies for a given
value of λ, and are given as following
a) The optimal procurement policy in forward market is order up to yu
b) The optimal spot market procurement policy is order up to zu
Proof: a) From (4.25) we get the convexity of K1t (z;λ) in z. zu is the unconstrained
minimum of K1t (z;λ). Thus, spot procurement is made up to zu if the inventory level
x is less than zu.
Proof: b) From (4.22) we get the convexity of J2t (y;λ) in y. yu is the uncon-
strained minimum of J2t (y;λ). Thus, spot procurement is made up to yu if the spot
procurement level zu is less than yu♦.
Next, we characterize the distributive policy to the retailers. In general, retailers
downstream tends to order more from upper echelon than what upper echelon would
desire to have as a service level at downstream retailers. This primarily occurs
because retailers do not incur convenience yield and transportation costs of procure-
ment upstream. Hence, lower costs accounted for holding inventory leads to higher
service level. Therefore, in order to align the procurement order from downstream
up to the level deemed optimal by upper echelon, upper echelon charges λ for each
unit procured by downstream.
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Lemma 4.7: Characterization of distribution policy as implied by Vλt
The optimal procurement at the retailer vi∗ is non increasing in λ.




≥ 0.Hence, optimal vi∗t is non-increasing in λ♦.
The upper echelon uses λ as a lever to adjust the stocking levels at the lower echelon.
The value of λ is ascertained through the sequence of properties developed in Section
4.3.2, and its impact on the lower echelon is given by Lemma 4.7.
Lemma 4.8: Characteristics of Optimal Procurement Policy
There exists an optimal solution to procurement and distribution policy which is
computationally feasible if in every period y∗t ≥ z∗t ≥ xt, and all the elements in
vector {δ̂t, δ̂t+1, δ̂t+2...........δ̂N} are known at time t.
Proof: Following the arguments in Property 1, if y∗t ≥ z∗t ≥ xt is satisfied in each
period then λ = δ̂t. Hence, if the values of δ̂ are known for subsequent periods then
all future values for λ will also be known resulting in an optimal solution. ♦
We know from Property 1 that for optimal solution to exists there has to be pro-
curement in the spot market and the forward market in every period. This optimal
solution is obtained assuming that the marginal convenience yield and transporta-
tion costs either remains same or are known for each period. Moreover, the value of
the Lagrange multiplier is entirely determined by market equilibrium in each period.
To our knowledge, this is the first model that reports an optimal solution under
more general framework. In the literature, it has been shown that if the balancing
condition is not violated then it is possible to attain an optimal solution. How-
ever, our result illustrates that even without making a balancing assumption it is
possible to obtain the optimal solution, given that marginal convenience yield and
transportation costs are known for future periods. Under more general conditions it
may not be possible to ascertain the value of marginal convenience yield for future
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periods as the prices are evolving in continuous time. Thus, it will not be possible
to calculate optimal value of r∗t and λ for general cases. Hence, we discuss some of
the approximations for calculating the values of r∗t and λ in Section 4.4.4
4.4.2 Lower Bound
For a given value of λ it is possible to calculate the function f it for each retailer,
similarly for a realized state space of χ and ω it is possible to compute the function
J1t . However, it is not possible to calculate the function J2t because it is not trivial to
compute the transitional probability from state (χt, ωt) to (χt+1, ωt+1). Therefore, we
propose a method to approximate these transitional probabilities through simulation.
We propose to chose a confidence interval for the value of χ and ω, which will be
time dependent and it is expected to increase with time. The state space variable
χ follows a log-normal distribution, which has a mean of 0 and variance given by
(1−e−2kt)σ2χ/2k. Thus, the variance of χ increases with time, but it is upper bounded
by σ2χ/2k. On the other hand, the state space variable ω follows a normal distribution
with mean µt and variance σ2ωt. Hence, mean and variance of ω grows linearly in
time. We will now discretized the state space of χ and ω, which will grow with
time, and simulate the probability transition from state space at time t to state
space in time t + 1. The confidence interval for ω and χ is given by µt ± zσ′ωt
and 0± z′(1− e−2kt)σ2χ/2k respectively, where z
′ represents the number of standard
deviations from the mean. The accuracy in calculation of lower bound will improve
with more fine partition of the state space, however, with more finer partitions
the complexity in numerical calculation increases. Hence, right balance has to be
maintained to obtain a bound that is feasible to calculate and is also accurate.
We propose a grid of state spaces with width of 0.01 for state space of both χ
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and ω. The center point of a square in a grid represents the coordinate of the state
space. The state space transitions to a different state space next period, however,
since χ and ω are continuous variables the transition point to a new grid will be
a continuum on the grid space. Any transition point in the square of a grid will
be approximated to have the coordinates of the center of the square as the state
space in order to discretized the continuous state space. The purpose of discretizing
the state space over a confidence interval is to obtain computational feasibility, but
there are additional challenges in dealing with it. Such as, how to deal with the
following cases; if the transition in next period occurs to a state space that is outside
the considered confidence interval or if the transition occurs from a state that is
outside the limits of confidence interval into a state that is in the limits of confidence
interval. For computational feasibility we ignore such cases. In the calculation of
V λt we need to calculate the dynamic program that has three dimension state space;
we have already established the method to calculate the transition probabilities for
state variables χ and ω; in addition, it is simple to calculate the transition probability
for demand. Also notice, that the evolution of demand is independent of the state
variables χ and ω.
In the calculation of the dynamic program, function f it is calculated for each
realization of demand and it is independent of the evolution of state spaces χ and ω;
function J1t can be calculated myopically for each realization of state space χ and ω,
and this function is independent of the realization of demand; function J2t is the one
that is computed dynamically and has to be evaluated for each realization of ξ, χ and
ω. Based on our choice of z′ we determine the percentage of transitions that occur
to the state spaces outside the confidence interval. The objective is to choose z′ such
that the percentage of transitions to the state space outside the confidence interval is
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reduced without significantly increasing the width of the confidence interval as larger
confidence interval leads to more computational challenges by marginally improving
the accuracy of the calculations. This described calculation procedure allows us to
compute the lower bound. Any V λt is a lower bound, but we will obtain the best
lower bound by searching a value of λ that maximizes the value of V λt
4.4.3 Upper Bound
An upper bound on ht(xt;λ) can be computed using the concept of limited look-ahead
policies, according to which the dynamic program is truncated after the finite number
of steps, and at each stage a decision is based on look-ahead of a limited number
of stages. The higher the number of stages the better is the approximation, but
more complex is the computation. We use two-stage look-ahead policy to compute
the decision variable at time t. This, assumes that planning horizon ends after two
periods. We define,
Wt(yt, xt) = β(ft + αbt)yt + (̂δt − λ)+xt − (λ− δ̂t)+yt − (St + ηbt )xt (4.29)
The optimal solution of the given dynamic program is used to calculate the upper




Wt(yt, xt) + EQEςt+1 minyt+1
{
Wt+1(yt+1, xt+1) + h̃t+2(yt+1 − ζt+1;λ)
}}
s.t yt ≥ xt;
where h̃t is the approximation such that the dynamic program terminates at
time t+ 2. The optimal solution obtained from h̃t can be used to calculate the up-
per bound. Also, the prices for the future periods are calculated as the expectation
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conditional on the price parameters observed at time t. For the computational pur-
poses, lets understand how the approximation of optimal policy yt can be calculated
at time t. We know that since the dynamic program terminates at time t + 2, the




 −St+2 − η
b
t+2, xt+2 < 0
−St+2 + ηbt+2, xt+2 > 0
Thus, EQEh̃′t+2(yt+1 − ζt+1) = −EQ(St+2)− ηbt+2 + 2ηbt+2Φt+1(yt+1)
From (4.29) ∂Rt+1/∂yt+1) = βf̂t+1 + βαbt+1 − (λ− δ̂t+1)+ − βf̂t+1 − βηbt+2 +
2ηbt+2Φt+1(yt+1),this leads to
Φt+1(yt+1) =
(λ− δ̂t+1)+ + βηbt+2 − βαbt+1
2ηbt+2
(4.30)
Here, it is important to notice that marginal convenience yield δ̂t+1 is approx-
imated by observing the price trajectory at time t. The above expression will yield
different stocking policies conditional on the current price parameters χt and ωt. It
is important to notice, that this stocking policy can be calculated as a closed form
solution for each sample path without having to calculate the dynamic program,




 (δ̂t+1 − λ)
+ − St+1 − ηbt+1, yt+1 > yt − ξt
h− λ+ βEh′t+2(xt+1), yt+1 < yt − ξt
We know that, βEh′t+2(xt+2) = −βft+1 − βηbt+2 + 2βηbt+2Φt+1(xt+1); Fur-
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thermore, h−λ+βEh′t+2(xt+1) = δt+1−λ−St+1−βηbt+2 +2βηbt+2Φt+1(xt+1);Thus,
EQEξht+1(yt − ξt) = −EQ(St+1) +
{




(δ̂t+1 − λ)+ − δt+1 + λ
}
(Φt(yt − yt+1)) + 2βηbt+2R(yt)







DytJt(yt, xt) = α
b
t − (λ− δ̂t)+ −
{






(δ̂t+1 − λ)+ − ηbt+1
}
Equating the above derivative to zero will yield yt, which will also depend
upon yt+1 that can be calculated from (4.30). Hence, the upper bound h̄t(xt;λ) can
be obtained by calculating the procurement cost along the sample path based on the
optimal policy obtained from the limited look ahead policy.
4.4.4 Approximation of Lagrangian Multiplier
In the Section 4.4.4 we characterized the optimal procurement policies and developed
an understanding on the value of λ based on the optimal policies. However, in this
section we develop a heuristic to approximate the value of Lagrangian multiplier.




Theorem 4.4: Heuristic for Lagrange Multiplier
Lagrange multiplier has the following characteristics iff y∗t ≥ z∗t .
a) if rt calculated at λ = δ̂t is such that rt ≥ xt, then λ∗ = δ̂t = δt + ηbt − αbt
b) if rt calculated at λ = 0 is such that xt ≥ rt, then λ∗ = 0
c) else, approximate λ∗such that λ∗ = [λ : rt = xt]
d) If, for a given λ, y∗t < z∗t then approximate λ∗such that λ∗ = [λ : y∗t = z∗t ]
Proof: a) if rt ≥ xt then zt = rt ≥ xt, thus from Property 1 λ∗ = δ̂t = δt + ηbt − αbt
b) if xt ≥ rt then zt = xt ≥ rt, thus λ∗ = 0
c) It is an approximation such that λ takes the value for which rt becomes equal to
xt.
d) since z∗t is decreasing in λ, the approximate value of λ should at least be such that
y∗t = z
∗
t ,♦ where y∗t is determined as given by limited look-ahead policy in Section
4.4.3
We developed structural properties on the Lagrange multiplier that are in-
strumental in developing the approximation to calculate the value of the Lagrangian
multiplier. The value of the Lagrangian multiplier denotes the imputed cost from the
retailer to the upper echelon. If the imputed cost is high then there will be procure-
ment from spot and forward market. If there is a positive procurement from spot
and forward market then the value of the Lagrange multiplier can be determined
from the market equilibrium through the spread in the spot and futures price, and
the transportation cost differential. If there is no procurement from the spot market
then the value of Lagrangian multiplier is less than δ̂t, where its value is used as a
lever to ensure that there is no procurement from the spot market. It is also possible
that the value of Lagrange multiplier may exceed δ̂t if y∗t < z∗t as the procurement
manager from upper echelon may not deem it optimal to procure from the forward
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market in wake of a possible demand downturn in future periods, however, a retailer
downstream experiencing stock out and substantially high penalty cost will drive the
value of the Lagrange multiplier higher.
4.5 Computational Results
In this section we illustrate through simulation the performance of the approximate
policies developed in the previous sections. We simulate 50 week planning horizon
with 1000 price paths and 50 demand paths, which leads to simulating 50,000 plan-
ning horizons. The purpose of this numerical study is two-folds; first to ascertain
the conditions under which the performance of bounds on the cost function, devel-
oped using market equilibrium information, is tight; second to understand better the
dynamics of the model such as the impact of demand and price variability, penalty
costs, and transportation costs on procurement policies from spot and forward mar-
ket. This research is motivated by the distribution of gasoline in the supply chain
of Chevron, however, for the purpose of gaining insight into the model we will sim-
ulate our model based on the data for crude oil. We use the parameters obtained
by Schwartz and Smith (2000) for crude oil data to simulate our model. These
parameters and initial conditions of the stochastic process are shown in Table 3. 2.
4.5.1 Stationary Demand and Identical Retailers
Table 4.1 elucidates that bounds developed using the proposed approximate policy
yields tight bounds under a range of stochastic process parameters and operating
parameters. Effect of penalty cost: With increase in penalty cost we observe that
the proportional procurement from spot market increases, this occurs because re-
tailers downstream are willing to trade additional procurement costs from the spot
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market with the cost of backlogging demand. This effect leads to the reduction of
inventory at the central warehouse. In addition, we observe that the bounds on
the cost function are tighter at high penalty cost because higher penalty cost for
retailers downstream compels the terminal manager to procure frequently from the
spot market, this allows the firm to determine the marginal cost of a unit transferred
to the downstream retailers through market equilibrium. Consequently, unravelling
of true cost of unit transferred in each period leads to tighter bounds. Effect of
coefficient of variation Increase in the coefficient of variation leads to higher propor-
tion of procurement from the forward market , this also leads to higher inventory at
the terminal because higher uncertainty in demand requires the manager of termi-
nal to carry higher level of stocks in order to be able to respond to the imbalance
of inventory at the retailers caused due to higher variations in demand. Since the
proportional procurement from spot market reduces it makes it relatively harder to
ascertain true cost of units transferred to downstream, which leads to wider gap in
the bounds.
Effect of short term fluctuations : High volatility in short term fluctuations leads
to higher futures prices, which on average translates to lower marginal convenience
yield. We do not witness any significant effect on the procurement pattern due to
short-term fluctuations in price in the presence of high penalty costs because these
fluctuations does not effect the optimal stocking policy of a retailer at high penalty
cost. However, if the penalty cost is low the optimal stocking levels of retailers are
more sensitive to the higher fluctuations in price, requiring higher proportion of pro-
curement from the spot market due to decrease in marginal convenience yield. We do
not observe any change in inventory at the warehouse due to short term fluctuations
in price. However, the total inventory in the system reduces because of non-linearity
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in optimal stocking levels, which decreases more sharply to higher spot prices than
the relative increase in stocking level due to lower spot prices. Similar effects are
observed on increase in fluctuations of long-term deviations in price, decrease in the
mean reverting coefficient. Effect of drift : Increase in the magnitude of negative
drift factor leads to higher backwardation in prices that translates to higher marginal
convenience yield. Intuitively, as the cost of marginal convenience yield increases the
inventory levels in the system should decrease,however, in contrast to our intuition
we observe that the inventory levels increase. This result occurs because as the cost
of marginal convenience yield increases it increases the cost of operating in the spot
market, as a result, higher proportion of inventory is procured from the forward
markets. In addition, higher level of inventory is desired in the system to mitigate
the risk of higher demand because of the reduced flexibility to procure from the spot
market as it is more costly to operate in the spot market . Moreover, the percentage
of inventory held at downstream retailers increases since the higher cost of marginal
convenience yield ensures stocking inventory at a location that is closer to consumers
in order to have more flexibility to respond to demand variations.
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Table 4.1: Sensitivity Analysis of Procurement Model
4.5.2 Non Stationary Demand and Non-Identical Retailers
After establishing the robustness of our model for the stationary case we turn
our attention to the scenario where retailers are non-identical and demand is non-
stationary, such cases have been traditionally known as being difficult to solve opti-
mally. Table 4.2 depicts the performance of bounds when demand is non-stationary
considering that there are five non-identical retailers downstream with the follow-
ing vector of mean demand [10,15,20,25,30], and each has an identical coefficient of
variation. In the literature of One Warehouse Multi Retailer optimal policies are
obtained by making a balancing assumption. These policies are a good approxima-
tion in a case of stationary demand, however, these policies perform poorly under the
case of Non-stationary demand. Significantly, in this research we derive approximate
policies that perform very well also under the case of Non-Stationary demand. As
illustrated in Table 4.2 we allow for demand to be cyclic with degrees of frequency
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varying from 1 to 12, where frequency refers to number of demand cycles in a year.
The coefficient of variance is kept constant by allowing for standard deviation to also
follow the same cycle as the mean of demand. Demand for retailer i in period t is
given by the following equation
ξit = µ
i + 5 ∗ sin[C ∗ (t− 1) ∗ π/(24.5)]
where, µi is the mean of the demand for retailer i, and C is the frequency of demand
cycles. Amplitude of the cyclic demand is 5 for all the retailers. Interestingly, even
for a case when we observe one demand cycle each month, the bounds developed
using the proposed methodology are tight, and are of the order of 1%. As the
coefficient of variance increases the gap in bounds increases, but the gap tends to
decrease at high penalty cost for the similar reasons stated above.
Table 4.2: Performance of Bounds when Demand is not Stationary
Table 4.3 exhibits the tightness of bounds when demand is stationary but
retailers are non-identical. We allow for non-identical in retailers by varying coef-
ficient of variation and the penalty costs across the retailers. In general, bounds
are tight when retailers are non-identical in the penalty costs, but the gap widens if
non-identicality is due to the difference in coefficient of variance.
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Table 4.3: Performance of Bounds when Retailers are Non Identical
4.6 Conclusions
This research contributes to the existing body of literature in the following ways 1) it
models stochasticity of prices in a distributive supply chain 2) it elucidates that the
market equilibrium information can be incorporated to obtain better procurement
and distribution policies 3) it develops a method to bound a cost function for multi-
location inventory model in presence of spot market. We obtain optimal policy for
serial multi-echelon inventory system, and for multi-location distribution system the
bounds developed are robust for non-stationary demand and non-identical retailers.
This research addresses how market price information observed on the commodity
market can be utilized to develop procurement and distribution policies to enhance
the efficacy of the supply chain.
In particular, this research models the distribution of gasoline in a two ech-
elon supply chain in a framework of one-warehouse multi-retailer which also has an
additional procurement flexibility from the spot market. Researchers have struggled
to find an optimal solution for the class of one-warehouse multi-retailer problems,
therefore, they have resorted to develop bounds on the cost function. The proposed
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solutions in the literature are quite robust for identical retailers and stationary de-
mand. Our paper extends the scope of the literature by developing a method that
results in tighter bounds for the cases in which retailers are non-identical and demand
is not stationary. Traditionally, in the problems of one-warehouse multi-retailer it is
difficult to ascertain the cost of a unit commodity transferred from the warehouse
to the downstream retailers due to the well known allocation constraint. This cost
is primarily dependent on the characteristics of the retail network, and is difficult to
compute, however, in our model cost of relaxing the allocation constraint can be de-
termined through market equilibrium, and it is much simpler to compute. This cost
is a combination of marginal convenience yield and transportation cost differential,
hence, the information on marginal convenience yield facilitates the development of
better procurement and distribution policies.
Our computational results derived from the model indicate that when de-
mand variability is high it is optimal to procure more through forward contracts
since central warehouse requires additional stocks to respond to the imbalances in
inventory at downstream echelon caused due to high variability in demand. On the
other hand, high uncertainty in price translates to higher futures prices which leads
to the reduction in the cost of marginal convenience yield, which makes it less ex-
pensive to transact in the spot market leading to higher proportion of procurement
from the spot market. Similarly, if the penalty cost incurred by downstream retailers
is high then higher fraction of stock is procured from spot market as it is judicious
to trade the cost of backlogging with the cost of transaction in spot market. The
methodology proposed in this paper yields tighter upper bounds on cost functions
when demand is non-stationary and retailers are non-identical. The main contri-
bution of the paper is to highlight the importance of including market equilibrium
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information in deciding procurement and distribution policies.
There are several extensions possible of this work. In the literature of Op-
erations Management considerable attention has been given to transshipment to
optimize the inventory in one-warehouse multiple-retailer framework. It will be an
interesting study to evaluate the conditions under which it makes strategic sense to
procure from spot market to fulfill the immediate requirements for inventory versus
having a transshipment from a different retailer. Also, the assumption of risk neu-
trality of a firm can be relaxed to incorporate risk-aversion of a firm, which may lead
to explore the hedging strategies for optimal procurement.
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Chapter 5
Effect of Term Structure of
Futures Price on the Spot
Procurement Policies
5.1 Introduction
Significant research has been done in the finance literature to develop pricing mod-
els that help predict the behavior of commodity prices. In general, these models
are continuous time stochastic price models where prices are assumed to follow a
Brownian Motion. These models involve the interaction among various factors that
primarily influence the prices; these factors define the term structure of the futures
price. It is common knowledge in the Finance literature that higher factor models
are difficult to estimate using empirical data, but they provide a better fit to the
futures price curve. However, it is not yet known that from the perspective of the
operations manager how useful is the accuracy on future price estimates in deter-
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mining its operating policies. In this research, we empirically test the significance of
additional information on term structure of futures prices on the procurement and
inventory related cost. In particular, we develop optimal procurement policy from
the spot market, and compare this policy when futures price estimates are based on
one factor model of Schwartz (1997), and two factor model of Schwartz and Smith
(2000). We refer to these policies as non-adaptive policies because in these models
the parameters of stochastic price process remains stationary. Furthermore, we al-
low for updating of stochastic prices process parameters for a two factor model in
Schwartz and Smith (2000) and refer to these set of policies as adaptive policies and
compare them against non-adaptive policies. In this research, we are using gasoline
as a commodity of interest.
In past couple of years commodity prices have shown considerable fluctuations
to significantly effect the procurement policies for commodity users. Price variation
of commodity effects the contract price of a commodity traded between buyers and
suppliers. There are contracts in practice that are subject to additional surcharge if
the commodity price increases beyond a pre-specified limit. Fluctuations in commod-
ity prices have generated a lot of interest in the finance literature which has led to the
development of rich body of literature on commodity price models. In general, com-
modity prices exhibit cyclical behaviors which has motivated researchers to model
commodity prices as mean reverting process. This implies that considerably high
prices either leads to lower consumption of these commodities or increase in supply
which drives prices towards its long term mean. Similarly, if prices decrease suffi-
ciently then it prompts suppliers to withhold the supply of the commodity leading
to an upward pressure on the prices. The fluctuation in prices reflect the dynamics
of supply and demand of a commodity, and other factors related to political and
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economic conditions. Significantly, the objective of this research is to ascertain the
impact of fluctuations in commodity prices on the procurement policies. In this re-
search, we evaluate the relevance of analytically developed procurement policies by
testing them through empirical data.
Historical data on commodity prices support the hypothesis of mean reversion
in prices as empirically shown by Schwartz (1997) and Bessembinder et al. (1995).
Bessembinder et al. (1995) finds strong mean reversion in agricultural commodities
and crude oil, but the degree of mean reversion is less in metals. In contrast, Hjal-
marsson (2003) shows that option prices for electricity based on Geometric Brownian
Motion are more accurate in parameter estimation than the price process based on
Ornstein-Uhlenbeck mean reverting process. This could be due to the absence of
long-term traded contracts in electricity markets or due to the non-storable nature
of electricity. Casassus and Collin-Dufresne (2005) document strong mean reversion
in the price of oil and copper and mild mean reversion in the prices of Gold and
Silver. In general, mean reversion in commodities is modeled as Ornstein-Uhlenbeck
process such as described in Schwartz (1997) for single factor models. The two
factor models include an additional model to explicitly model the short-term devia-
tions from long-term equilibrium mean. Some examples of two factor models include
Schwartz (1997), Schwartz and Smith (2000) and Gibson and Schwartz (1990). Two
factor model provides a much better fit to the futures price curve than one factor
model when there is more time variation in the marginal convenience yield of the
commodity. Schwartz (1997), and Hilliard and Reis (1998) develop a three factor
model to predict the commodity prices where the third factor captures the stochas-
ticity in interest rates, and concludes that the the benefit of three factor model is
marginal in comparison to that of two factor model. Thus, we limit our analysis to
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one and two factor models.
The challenge in implementing the stochastic price models is that the state
variables of the term structure is not directly observable from the market data.
Thus, it requires advanced statistical tools like Kalman filter to estimate the state
variables and the parameters of the stochastic process. In addition, the parame-
ters of stochastic process are not stationary and change with time, this confounds
the problem of calibrating these stochastic price models. Stochasticity of volatil-
ity has been of concern in the Finance literature and has been addressed by Deng
(2000), Pindyck (2004) and many other authors. Similarly, the non-stationarity in
correlation coefficients has also been documented. One method of dealing with this
issue is to model a parameter itself as a stochastic process, but such endeavor will
lead to multiple factors in the model due to large number of parameters making
impossible to develop a closed form solution for futures prices. Other solution to
this problem is to calibrate the model more frequently as more information about
futures price becomes available. We adopt this approach and update the parameters
of the stochastic process on a monthly basis, and the optimal procurement policy
developed is termed as adaptive policy. In this research, we compare the impact of
adaptive policies with non-adaptive policies on the cost of procurement.
Economists have studied the impact of spread in spot and futures prices on the
overall inventory levels of the industry. On the other hand, Operations Management
has developed inventory policies for an individual firm based on constant or known
prices. In this research, we combine the knowledge of these two areas to develop
inventory policies for a firm under the paradigm of fluctuating prices, subsequently,
these policies are empirically tested. In particular, we focus on procurement policies
of a commodity from a spot market.
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5.2 Term Structure Model
Commodity price models have been developed in Finance literature. In this paper,
we compare the effect of one and two factor price process model on the procurement
policies of a firm. We use one factor model as described in Schwartz (1997), and
the two factor pricing model developed by Schwartz and Smith (2000), from now on
referred to as S&S, for the evaluation of the commodity prices. These two models
are described in detail below.
5.2.1 Schwartz (1997) One Factor Model
The one factor model follows a Ornstein Uhlenbeck process, which allows for mean
reversion in prices as shown below
dχt = κ(α− χt)dt+ σχdZ (5.1)
where, spot price of the commodity at time t is denoted by ln(St) = χt, α represents
the long term average of prices, κ is the mean reversion factor, σχ is the volatil-
ity associated with prices, and dZ is the increment of Brownian Motion associated
with the stochastic process. Under a risk neutral measure, the futures price of a
commodity given at time t with maturity of the futures contract at time T is given
as




where, α∗ is given as (α − λ),where λ represents the risk premium of price of the
commodity. For two factor model of Schwartz and Smith (2000) refer to Section
3.2.1.
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5.3 Optimal Procurement Policy from a Commodity Mar-
ket with Spot Transaction Costs.
In this section, we characterize optimal procurement policy for a firm that is either
risk neutral to demand risk or is sufficiently capable to completely diversify the de-
mand risk. This firm engages in spot procurement of the commodity, and transforms
the basic commodity through its technological expertise to a value added product.
At the start of each period, procurement manager evaluates the inventory position
xt and makes a spot procurement decision zt in order to satisfy stochastic demand
that follows a normal distribution φt(ξ). The unsatisfied demand is backlogged and
the firm incurs a cost of p per unit per period for any unsatisfied demand. Similarly,
excess inventory costs h per unit per period. These excess and shortage costs related




h(zt − ξ)φt(ξ) dξ +
∫ ∞
zt
p(ξ − zt)φt(ξ) dξ
The objective of the procurement manager is to minimize procurement and
inventory costs in presence of stochastic prices and uncertain demand. The cost
function is denoted as a dynamic program which has inventory level as the state
variable. In addition, the dynamic program also depends on the variables associated
with the price process; χt when using one factor model; χt and ωt when using two
factor model. However, for notational simplification we will drop the state variables
of price from the dynamic program. The procurement model also allows for selling
excessive stock of inventory in the spot market.
In practice, there is reluctance on the part of firms to frequently sell in com-
modity markets a short term excess inventory. This reluctance could be attributed
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to transaction costs, which consist of financial transaction cost as well as transporta-
tion and handling costs. Even though financial transaction costs can be considered
negligible, handling and shipping goods from one location to another could be a
costly affair; hence the importance of understanding the influence of these costs on
the procurement process from spot markets. Thus, we include transaction costs
in spot procurement. In order to understand better the dynamics induced by spot
transaction costs we allow spot transaction costs incurred while selling and buying to
be different. Let us denote the transaction cost per unit charged during buying and
selling by λbt and λst respectively, and their sum as λbst = λbt + λst . At the end of the
horizon, excess stock is sold in the spot market at the prevailing price in the market.
Similarly, shortages are covered by buying in the spot market at current price. The
costs associated with procurement is given by the following dynamic program
V St (x) = minzt
{













t+1(zt − ξt, χ, ω) φt(ξ) ψt(χ, ω|χt, ωt) dξ dχ dω
and, ψt(χ, ω|χt, ωt) is the probability density that the long term price factor
and short term price factor in time t + 1, assume the values (χ, ω) given that their
values at time t are (χt, ωt), and β is the discount rate corresponding to the risk
free rate. The first term of the dynamic program given by (5.2) represent the cost
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of purchase from the spot market, the second term represents the revenues from
selling excessive stock in the spot market, the third term gives the loss function
that combines penalty and holding costs, and the fourth term refers to the cost to
go function. Substituting (zt − xt) = (zt − xt)+ − (xt − zt)+ the above objective
function can be modified as
V St (xt, χt, ωt) = minzt
{




V ST (xT , χT , ωT ) = (ST + λ
b
T )(−xT )+ − (ST − λsT )(xT )+.
Define the function JSt (xt, zt) as
JSt (xt, zt) = (S + λ
b
t)(zt − xt) + λbst (xt − zt)+ + Lt(zt) +HSt (zt). (5.4)
Lemma 5.1. Characterization of V St and JSt .
The cost function V St (xt, χt, ωt) is convex in xt, and JSt (xt, zt) is convex in xt and
zt.
Proof: Immediate by induction ♦.
Although JSt is convex, it can be observed from (5.4), that it is not differentiable at
zt = xt, hence we need to rely on its sub-differential for its optimization. To this
end denote as D− and D+ the left and right derivative respectively, we use D± as a
shorthand to denote ‘both the left and right derivatives respectively, and denote the
sub-differential of any convex function g at x with ∂g(x) defined as the set valued
function ∂g : x [D−x g(x), D+x g(x)] Rockafellar (1970). Then a sufficient condition for
x∗ to minimize g(x) is that 0 ∈ ∂g(x∗). We will interpret scalar addition and
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positive scalar multiplication operations on sub-differentials and intervals as point-









t (z + c)
]
for any scalars a, b > 0, and c. We
also define the indicator function 1{A} as assuming a value of 1 whenever the logical
condition{A} is true and zero otherwise. Theorem 5.1 below further refines the
characterization of optimal procurement policies.
Theorem 5.1. Characterization of Optimal Procurement Policies.
The optimal procurement policy in spot market can be characterized by two points zbt
and zst , zbt ≤ zst as follows:
(a) If xt < zbt , z∗t = zbt ; buy (zbt − xt) units to rise the commodity’s inventory up to
zbt .
(b) If xt > zst , z∗t = zst ; sell (xt− zst ) units to lower the commodity’s inventory down
to zst .
(c) If zbt ≤ xt ≤ zst , z∗t = xt; do not procure.
Proof: we proceed by induction on t. It can be verified that the policy form is
valid in period T − 1. For any other period t, we first assume the above policy form
is valid for period t + 1, and consider the sufficient condition 0 ∈ ∂JSt (zt) in the
following cases: (1) xt < z∗t , (2) xt > z∗t , and (3) xt = z∗t . First we characterize


































It follows from (5.5) that −(St+1 + λbt+1) ≤ D±x V St+1 ≤ −(St+1 − λst+1). From the
definition of HSt in (5.3) it follows that D±ztH
S







ξt, χ, ω), and it follows from the risk neutral measure that EQ(χ,ω|χt,ωt)(St+1) = ft;
then, from (5.5) for any zt we obtain D−ztH
S









t (zt) = −β(ft + λbt+1) + βλbst+1 Pr{zt − ξt ≥ zst+1}(5.6)[
ft + λbt+1 + EξL
′




Pr{zbt+1 ≤ zt − ξt < zst+1}
and it follows from the convexity of V St+1 that HS
′
t (zt) is a nondecreasing function
with −β(ft + λbt+1) ≤ HS
′
t (zt) ≤ −β(ft − λst+1). The sub-differential ∂JSt (zt) is
obtained from (5.4) and (5.6) as












Case 1 (xt < z∗t ): In this case, imposing the condition 0 ∈ ∂JSt (zt) on (5.7) is
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equivalent to requiring
(St + λbt)− p+ (p+ h)Φt(zt) +HS
′
t (zt) = 0. (5.8)
Observe that both Φt(zt) andHSt
′(zt) are nondecreasing functions, and that as zt+∞
the left hand side of the above condition becomes St + h− ft + (λbt + βλst+1) which
is positive as the marginal convenience yield cannot be negative. Define zbt as the
value of zt that solves the above condition or zbt = 0 if none does.
Case 2 (xt > z∗t ): Imposing the condition 0 ∈ ∂JSt (zt) on (5.7) results in
(St + λbt)− p+ (p+ h)Φt(zt) +HSt
′
(zt) = λbst . (5.9)
An analysis similar to the one in Case 1 leads to define zst as the value of zt that
solves the above condition; we let zst = 0 if the left hand side of the above condition
is larger than (λbt + λst ) for zt = 0, or zst = +∞ if the limit of left hand side of the
above condition is smaller than (λbt + λst ) as zt +∞. The condition zbt ≤ zst is also
satisfied.
Case 3 (xt = z∗t ): In this case, the first order condition emanating from (5.7) is
0 ≤ (St + λbt)− p+ (p+ h)Φt(zt) +HSt
′
(zt) ≤ λbst .
Comparing this condition with the ones for Case 1 and Case 2, it follows that z∗t = xt
satisfies the above optimality condition for all zbt ≤ xt ≤ zst♦.
The optimal policy for this model can be characterized as a critical interval
policy in the sense that the optimal decision is to buy/sell enough stock so that
the inventory position reaches the interval [zbt , zst ], and do nothing if xt ∈ [zbt , zst ].
Obtaining the values for zbt and zst in the optimal policy is not practical as the
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evaluation of Pr{zt − ξt ≥ zst+1} and Pr{zbt+1 ≤ zt − ξt < zst+1} in (5.6) is very
complex. Notice that Pr{zt − ξt ≥ zst+1} is the probability that the optimal policy
in period t+ 1 requires to sell in the spot market while Pr{zbt+1 ≤ zt − ξt < zst+1} is
the probability of not trading in t+ 1. Following we develop bounds on the optimal
policy space
Theorem 5.2: Bounds on Optimal Procurement Policies
The optimal policy points zbt and zst are bounded by zbt ≤ zbt ≤ z̄bt , and zst ≤ zst ≤ z̄st ,
where the bounds can be computed myopically by solving:
Φt(zbt) =
p+ βft − βλst+1 − St − λbt
p+ h
, Φt(z̄bt ) =




p+ βft − βλst+1 − St + λst
p+ h
, Φt(z̄st ) =
p+ βft + βλst+1 − St + λst
p+ h
.
Proof: We develop upper bounds on zbt and zst by solving (5.8) and (5.9) under the
assumption that the optimal policy in t+ 1 requires us to procure with probability
one, Pr{zt − ξt < zbt+1} = 1; similarly we obtain lower bounds on the optimal policy
on period t by solving (5.8) and (5.9) under the assumption that in period t+ 1 the
optimal policy will require us to sell with probability one, Pr{zt − ξt > zst+1} = 1♦.
The above bounds, or any point in between, can be used to approximate the optimal




z̄bt , if xt < z̄bt
xt, if z̄bt ≤ xt ≤ z̄st
z̄st , if xt > z̄bt .
This approximation is equivalent to assuming that the probability of the optimal
policy in t+1 requiring to buy stock in the spot market is one, Pr{zt−ξt < zbt+1} = 1.
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We denote the cost of operating under this procurement policy as Ṽ St (xt, χt, ωt); this
cost can be obtained from (5.2) inductively by replacing zt with z̃t and eliminating
the minimization operation. Clearly V St ≤ Ṽ St . Like the model in Section 3.3.1, this
approximate policy can be obtained myopically, and in order to test the tightness of
such an approximation we develop a lower bound on the cost function. To this end
define
V St (xt, χt, ωt) = minzt
{











V St+1(zt − ξt, χ, ω) φt(ξ) ψt(χ, ω|χt, ωt) dξ dχ dω,
and
V ST (xT , χT , ωT ) = −(ST + λbT )xT .
Thus, lower bound on the cost function V St (xt, χt, ωt) is obtained by ignoring the
transaction cost of inventory sold in the spot market, λbst (xt − zt)+ ≥ 0.
Theorem 5.3: Lower bound on V St .
(a) The function V St defined by (5.10) is a lower bound on V St .
(b) V St is convex in xt
Proof: To establish claim (a) We proceed by induction on t. It is immediate from
their respective definitions that V ST ≤ V ST . Now assume the same relationship holds
for t + 1; then HSt (zt) ≤ HSt (zt), and since (λbt + λst )(xt − zt)+ ≥ 0 we must have
V St ≤ V St . The proof of claim (b) is immediate by induction on t.
We obtain from (5.10) that D+ztH
S
t (zt) = −βft−βλbt+1. Then it follows from
the convexity of V St that the optimal policy for program (5.10), denoted as zLt , can
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p+ βft − St + βλbt+1 − λbt
p+ h
.
It is clear from the analysis above that V St ≤ V St ≤ Ṽ St . Thus Ṽ St − V St is an
upper bound on the approximation error incurred by using the approximate policy
z̃t instead of the optimal. In Section 5.5 we calculate this approximation error.
5.4 Kalman Filter Procedure
Challenge in implementing the above mentioned pricing models is that the state
variables and parameters of these models are not directly observable from the mar-
ket data. Once the model is written in a state space form Kalman filtering process
can be used to estimate the parameters of the process and the unobservable state
variables based on the futures price data for the commodity. In this research, we are
estimating the prices process parameters and state variables for gasoline. Kalman
filtering is a statistical tool that recursively computes the optimal estimator of state
variable based on the information available at time t. The estimates are continu-
ously updated as new information about prices becomes available. If the initial state
space variable distribution is normal then Kalman filter allows for the calculation
of likelihood function to estimate the parameters of the prices process. Kalman fil-
tering techniques are effective when either the initial state space distribution is well
specified or the sample size is too large such that the initial state space specifications
are unimportant. For detailed understanding on Kalman filtering we refer readers to
Harvey (1991) and Schwartz and Smith (2000). Futures prices for different maturi-
ties are regressed with unobservable state variables through measurement equations.
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State variables are generated through the transition equations, which discretized the
stochastic process. These set of equations are described in detail for both pricing
models in the following subsection.
5.4.1 One Factor Model
The measurement equation for one factor model can be written as
yt = ct +GtXt + εt t = 1, 2, ....NT




4κ (1 − e
−2κTi)]; T1, T2....Tn are the different times at which the different
future contracts mature.
Gt = [e−κTi ] where i is the vector N × 1
εt is N × 1 vector of serially uncorrelated disturbances, where E(εt) = 0
From (5.1) the transition equation can be written as Xt = dt + ZtXt−1 + ηt
where dt = κα∆t, Zt = e−κ∆t and ηt is the vector of uncorrelated disturbances with
E(ηt) = 0 and V ar(ηt) = σ2χ∆t
5.4.2 Two Factor Model
The measurement equation for two factor model can be written as
yt = ct +G
′
tXt + εt
where, yt = ln[f(Ti)] where i is the vector N × 1 of observable prices. ct = [A(Ti)]
is a N × 1 vector; and Gt = [e−κTi1] is a matrix of N × 2
εt is a vector N × 1 of serially uncorrelated disturbances, where E(εt) = 0;
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From (3.1) and (3.2) the transition equation can be written as Xt = dt +ZtXt−1 +ηt





is a 2 × 2 matrix, and ηt is the vector













We briefly discuss the parameter estimation process for a two factor model, but
we refer readers to Schwartz and Smith (2000) for a detailed understanding of the
parameter estimation process. With the set of transition and measurement equation,
and observed futures prices for different maturities Kalman filter is run based on
initial value of [χ0, ω0]. Initial mean vector m0 and covariance matrix C0 is assumed.
In the following period, new observation on price in conjunction with the mean vector
and covariance matrix of the previous period are used to calculate the posterior mean
and covariance matrix. As stated by Schwartz and Smith (2000), this mean and
covariance matrix is given as
E[χt, ωt] = at +At(yt − ft)




at = ct + Ztmt−1 mean of (χt, ωt) based on what is known at time t− 1
Rt = ZtCt−1Z
′
t +W ; Covariance of (χt, ωt) based on what is known at time t− 1
ft = dt +G
′




tRtGt + V Covariance of period t futures price based on what is known at
time t− 1
At = RtGtQ−1t ; Correction to predicted state variables at based on the difference in
actual and predicted value of futures price
As stated in Harvey (1991) Kalman filtering allows the calculation of a like-
lihood function for a given set of parameters. In the case of two-factor model of SS
there are seven parameters to be estimated (κ, σχ, σω, ρ, µ, µ∗, λχ), along with terms
in the covariance matrix for the measurement errors (V ). As mentioned in Schwartz
(1997), Schwartz and Smith (2000) and Hahn (2005) it is assumed for simplification
that the errors in the covariance matrix are uncorrelated. The general form for the












F−1t (yt − ŷt|t−1) + const
where,
Ft = E[(yt − ŷt|t−1)(yt − ŷt|t−1)
′
], Schwartz and Smith (2000) use maxlik
routine in Gauss to numerically determine the estimates of the above parameters.
In order to estimate the parameters a set of input parameters are provided then
Kalman filter is run that outputs the optimal set of parameters, which might not
be global. Global optimal parameters are the once that give maximum likelihood




We use data on futures contract for unleaded Gasoline HU traded on NYMEX. The
prices are listed in US cents for one gallon of gasoline. Our data set is from 10/1/99
to 3/8/2005 for contracts maturing from 5 months to up to 11 months. Gasoline
price are known to exhibit seasonality, however, due to non-availability of long term
maturing futures contracts it is difficult to accurately estimate the seasonality com-
ponent in the prices. Therefore, we refrain from estimating seasonality in prices in
this research. Next, we show the results of parameter estimation for one and two
factor models.
5.5.1 State Variable and Parameter Estimation
Table 5.1 shows the parameter estimation for the one factor model. We observe
that the mean reversion in prices is slow, and volatility in prices is lower than in
comparison to that estimated from two factor model. Parameter estimates from
the two factor model is listed in Table 5.2. These estimates are based on monthly
basis from March 2004 to February 2005, where parameters are estimated till March
2004 using the data set from 10/1/99 to 3/31/2004 and thereafter, these parameters
are updated on the monthly basis. In addition, the standard error associated with
these estimates are also listed in Table 5.2. The short-term volatility in prices is
much higher than in comparison to the long-term equilibrium price volatility. Also,
we observe that the volatilities for short term and long term factor remains almost
constant over a year. The mean reversion factor fluctuates somewhat between 1.63
and 1.89. Typically, mean reversion factor is difficult to estimate as there are only
limited number of cycles of price over a given data set of prices. Interestingly, we find
negative correlation between short-term and long-term prices. The correlation factor
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is small in magnitude and the standard error associated with its estimation is large
so it is not clear if the correlation factor is significant. However, this observation
is puzzling and we do not have a justifiable explanation for this phenomenon at
this time. Furthermore, on examining the standard errors for the parameters we
observe that the estimates for µ and λχ are not very accurate due to larger values
of standard error. We do get a good estimate of µ∗ = µ− λω, which represents the
risk-adjusted long-term growth/decline in the futures prices. The explanation for
inaccurate estimation of µ and λχ can be attributed to Schwartz and Smith (2000)
who conclude that λχ and λω determines the difference in expected spot and futures
prices, and since expected spot prices are never observable it is difficult to estimate
the parameters related to risk premium. On the other hand, the state variables are
easy to estimate with almost negligible error. We estimate initial state parameters
as χ0 = 4.34 and ω0 = −0.045.
Table 5.1: Estimation of parameters from One Factor Model
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Table 5.2: Monthly Parameter Estimation for Two Factor Model
5.5.2 Model Comparison
In this section, we compare three policies based on optimal policy for the lower bound
developed in Theorem 5.3 in section 5.4. First policy is termed as One Factor model
(OF) in which future price estimates are based on the one-factor model and the spot
price observed in this period as discussed in Section 5.2.1. Similarly, second policy
is termed as Non -Adaptive Two-Factor model (NATF) where future price estimates
are based on a two factor model, as discussed in section 3.2.3, where parameters of
the model are not update and remain stationary for the rest of the horizon. Third
policy is termed as Adaptive Two Factor model (ATF) where parameters of the
stochastic process are updated on the monthly basis upon the availability of new
information on futures prices. In this analysis, the stochastic process follows that
adaptive process acting as a benchmark to judge the performance of the OF and
NATF models. In order to have a detailed analysis, we break procurement cost into
two parts, controllable and uncontrollable cost. Uncontrollable cost are the cost
that are unaffected by the procurement policy. Controllable costs are further broken
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down into penalty costs, holding costs, trading costs and Appreciation/Depreciation





(St + λbt)(zt − zt−1 + ξt−1)+ − (St − λst )(zt−1 − zt − ξt−1)+
+h(zt − ξt)+ + p(ξt − zt)+,






(St + λbt − St+1 − λbt+1)(zt − ξt) + h(zt − ξt)+ (5.11)






where, ξt−1 = 0. First term in (5.11) represents Appreciation/ Depreciation cost of
inventory, second term is the holding cost, third term is the penalty cost, fourth
term represents the trading costs. These first four terms comprise controllable cost.
The fifth term is the uncontrollable cost. Notice, that Appreciation/Depreciation
cost of inventory captures the change in valuation of leftover inventory from one pe-
riod to another. All other costs are self-explanatory. Comparative analysis between
various policies is done based on the controllable costs. ∆A−N denotes the benefit
of Adaptive policy (ATF) over Non-Adaptive (NATF) policy, ∆A−O represents the
benefit of Adaptive policy (ATF) over One Factor (OF) model, and ∆N−O represents
the benefits of Non-Adaptive (NATF) policy over One Factor (OF) model. Table
5.3 illustrates the comparative analysis of the policies, and the overall conclusion is
that policies based on two factor model outweighs the policy based on one factor
model. Observe that the stocking policy based on One Factor (OF) model yields
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higher stocking levels than in comparison to NATF based policy. This allows OF
based policy to have a lower penalty costs in compare to NATF policy, but the real
cost advantage of NATF policy is derived from Appreciation/Depreciation costs of
inventory. Better ability to exploit the time varying marginal convenience yield al-
lows NATF based policy to achieve lower costs in-spite of carrying lower inventory.
This can have a profound impact in supply chains and to the financial performance
of the firms as lower inventory levels can free extra cash to be used for more inno-
vative purposes. When transaction cost is low the benefits of two factor model over
single factor model are around 27%, but with increase in transaction costs these
benefits decline to around 13%. Two factor model captures the time variation in
convenience yield much better than the one factor model which leads to more effi-
cient cost management under two factor model paradigm. Surprisingly, there is no
benefit of ATF based policy over NATF policy. ATF based policy have even lower
stocking levels than NATF based policy, thus, higher penalty costs, but these extra
costs are equally balanced out by saving from the Appreciation/Depreciation costs.
Interestingly, the error in bounds is negligible when coefficient of variation is small
and transaction costs are small. However, the gap in the bound increases sharply
with higher transaction costs and larger coefficient of variation. Thus, the policy
developed in the lower bound is not robust for the high transaction cost and high
demand variance environment.
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Table 5.3: Comparative Analysis of One Factor, Two Factor and Adaptive-Two
Factor Based Policies
5.5.3 Cyclical Demand
Policy obtained through lower bound on cost function yields sufficiently tight bounds
when transaction costs are lower, but we seek to explore how it performs when
demand is non-stationary, We consider demand as non-stationary and cyclical that
follows a sine curve given by ξt = µt + A ∗ sin{c ∗ π ∗ (t− 1)/24.5}, where A is the
amplitude and C is the frequency of the sine curve. Table 5.4 illustrates that bound
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developed on cost function is not tight when demand is highly cyclical and follows
almost a monthly cycle. The quality of bound further deteriorates when coefficient
variation is high and the Amplitude of the demand curve is high.
Table 5.4: % Error on Bounds for the Cyclical Demand Based on Lower Bound
Policy
The % error in the bound is 41% when coefficient of variation is 0.4 and
demand curve follows a monthly cycle with amplitude equal to 40% of the mean
demand. Therefore, we propose to use a [z̄at , z̄bt ] policy described in Section 5.3 .
This policy is a critical interval policy which restricts the selling in the spot market
and leads to much tighter bounds. Table 5.5 shows that the gap in bound decreases
from 41% to 1.13 % on implementation of the two point policy, and the quality of
bound is good for high variance in cyclical demand with high amplitude in demand
curve. In addition, Table 5 .6 illustrates that bounds are also very tight when
transaction costs are high for highly variable demand.
Table 5.5: % Error on bounds for the cyclical demand based on Two Point policy
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Table 5.6: % Error on bounds for the cyclical demand based on Two Point policy
5.6 Conclusions
We explore the procurement policy of a commodity from the spot market under
stochastic demand and random prices for a multi-period planning horizon. We char-
acterize the optimal procurement policy and bound the optimal policy space. This
research addresses the impact of information on term structure of futures prices on
the procurement policy of an operations manager. There is volumes of literature
in finance documenting one factor and two factor based commodity pricing models.
Yet, there has not been a study that delves into exploring the impact of these models
on the operational policy of a firm. We conclude that two factors based futures price
forecast yields substantial improvements in costs over the policy that has futures
price forecast based on a single factor. In addition, for gasoline we do not observe
any advantage of calibrating the two factor model more frequently as the parame-
ters of stochastic price process remain almost stationary for the one year planning
horizon. A better futures price forecast allows a firm to stock less and yet reduce
the cost of inventory by capitalizing on the time varying marginal convenience yield.
Inventory reduction is a prime focus of any firm in order to enhance flexibility and
agility to respond better to the changing dynamics of the marketplace. The policy
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developed in this research can lead to better operational efficiency of a firm and
enhance its financial performance.
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Chapter 6
Concluding Remarks and Future
Research
Commodity prices have shown considerable fluctuation in past couple of years. Op-
erations Managers confront the problem of fluctuating prices when designing the
optimal procurement policies. This research provides a framework to incorporate
information of prices on spot and future markets in obtaining optimal procurement
and distribution policies. Specifically, this research achieves four main objectives 1)
models stochasticity in prices through a continuous stochastic price process 2) in-
corporates information on time varying marginal convenience yield 3) characterizes
optimal procurement and distribution policies for various supply chain structures,
and 4) quantifies the benefits of using a two factor model based futures price forecast
in cost management.
The main managerial insight from this research postulates that commodity
market exogenously determines the cost of holding a commodity through spread in
spot and futures prices also referred to as marginal convenience yield, on the other
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hand, a firm has a decreasing marginal benefit of each additional unit of commodity
stored. The balancing of these costs and benefits yields optimal stocking levels. In
addition, these trade-off change every period which requires to adjust stocking levels
accordingly. This entails to incorporating the time varying marginal convenience
yield in the analysis. The central theme in the dissertation is to ascertain how firms
should adapt their operating policies in wake of changing dynamics of supply and
demand that gets reflected in the prices. Our results illustrate that on incorporating
time varying convenience yield in the structure of the optimal policy can reduce
inventory related costs substantially. Inventory reduction is a pursuit of every firm,
achieving this objective without sacrificing the flexibility to satisfy random demand
improves the financial performance of the firm and makes supply chain more efficient.
This research develop tools that specifically will allow operation managers to achieve
these objectives.
Furthermore, in the third chapter of dissertation, we develop buying and
selling policies from spot and forward markets in presence of transaction costs. We
are able to characterize the policy structure but it is not easy to compute it, thus, we
develop an approximation of the policy and show that bounds on the cost function
are tight. Forward procurement policies are characterized by a critical interval,
where if the inventory is below the lower end of the critical interval than forward
purchase is made upto the lower end of the critical interval, if the inventory is
higher than the upper end of the critical inventory than inventory is brought down
to the upper end of the critical interval by selling excesses in the forward market.
Spot market inventory policy has a similar yet more complicated structure to it.
Moreover, results indicate that manufacturers are willing to trade inferior demand
information with lower transaction cost to procure higher fraction from the forward
121
market and procure from spot market to fine tune the stocking levels.
In addition, we elaborate in the fourth chapter of dissertation how marginal
convenience yield can be used to design procurement and distribution policies in a
multi-echelon distributive system. We develop bounding techniques for the Lagrange
multiplier of an allocation constraint to obtain efficient procurement and distribution
policies without making a balancing assumption, a common assumption in the one-
warehouse multiple retailers related problem. The dualization technique developed
in this chapter allows us to develop tight bounds even when demand is non-stationary
and retailers are non-identical.
Once we develop operating policies based on the forecast of futures prices, we
quantify the benefits of using two-factor model over one-factor model. One-factor
and two-factor models are well researched in the Finance literature and it has been
well established that two-factor models provide a better fit to the forecast of futures
prices. However, it is not known how much value a two-factor model creates for
an operations manager. Our empirical analysis on gasoline shows that there are
substantial cost savings on using a two-factor model to forecast the futures price. In
addition, the parameters of stochastic price process do not remain stationary and
there arises a need to frequently calibrate the models. Our analysis illustrates that




Proof Theorem 3.2: We proceed by induction on t. It can be verified that the
policy form is valid in period T − 1. For any other period t, we first assume the
above policy form is valid for period t + 1, and verify that the sufficient conditions
0 ∈ ∂zJSt (z∗t , y∗t ) and 0 ∈ ∂yJSt (z∗t , y∗t ) are satisfied in all cases (a) -(h). The proof
proceeds by verifying that 0 ∈ ∂zJSFt (z∗t , y∗t ) for z∗t as specified in each of the five
parts (d) through (h), and in each of the above cases we show that 0 ∈ ∂yJSt (z∗t , y∗t )
for the values of y∗t prescribed by parts (a)-(c) of the theorem.
Part (a): If zt ≤ ybt then y∗t = ybt , thus we need to show that 0 ∈ ∂yJSFt (zt, ybt ). It
follows from (3.19) that ∂yJSFt (zt, ybt ) = [−βαbst , 0], hence 0 ∈ ∂yJSFt (zt, ybt )














t (zt, zt) goes from [−βαbst , 0] for y∗t = ybt to [0, βαbst ] for y∗t = yst . Hence,
0 ∈ ∂yJSFt (zt, zt).
Part (c): If yst ≤ zt then y∗t = yst thus we need to show that 0 ∈ ∂yJSFt (zt, yst ). It
follows from (3.20) that ∂yJSFt (zt, yst ) = [0, βαbst ], hence 0 ∈ ∂yJSFt (zt, yst )
Part (d): We need to consider the following four cases depending of the values of
ybt and yst .
Case (d-i) ybt ≤ yst < zbt : In this case z∗t = zbt , and y∗t = yst < zbt , thus we need
to show that 0 ∈ ∂zJSFt (zbt , yst ), and 0 ∈ ∂yJSFt (zbt , yst ). It follows from (3.14) that
the first order condition 0 ∈ ∂zJSFt (zbt , yst ) becomes Kt(zbt ) = −βαbst as claimed in
(3.15). If Kt(0) ≤ −βαbst , since Kt is nondecreasing, there is a zt satisfying the above
condition; if Kt(0) > −βαbst , we define zbt = 0. Moreover, from (3.13) it follows that




t ) = α
s
t − ft as in (3.20).
Case (d-ii) ybt < zbt ≤ yst : Now z∗t = zbt = y∗t , and we need to show that
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0 ∈ ∂zJSFt (zbt , zbt ), and 0 ∈ ∂yJSFt (zbt , zbt ). It follows directly from (3.14) and
(3.15) that ∂zJSFt (zbt , zbt ) = [−βαbs, 0], and from (3.13) we obtain ∂yJSFt (zbt , zbt ) =










t )]. It follows from (3.19) and (3.20) that




t ) ≤ −ft + αst for ybt ≤ zbt ≤ yst , hence ∂yJSFt (zbt , zbt ) ranges from
β[−αbst , 0] to β[0, αbst ] as zbt goes from ybs to yst , hence 0 ∈ ∂yJSFt (zbt , zbt ).
Case (d-iii) zcbt < ybt : In this case, z∗t = zcbt and y∗t = ybt . The first order conditions
become ∂zJSFt (zcbt , ybt ) = Kt(zcbt ) = 0 as claimed in (3.16), and ∂yJSFt (zcbt , ybt ) =
β
(






= 0 is equivalent to HSF ′t (ybt ) = −ft − αbt establishing
(3.19). Hence z∗t = zcbt and y∗t = ybt minimize JSFt . Moreover, since both Kt(zt)
and HSF ′t (yt) are nondecreasing, it follows that zbt ≤ zcbt and ybt ≤ yst .
Case (d-iv) zbt ≤ ybt ≤ zcbt : Here (a) and (d) prescribe z∗t = y∗t = ybt and the optimal-









0 ∈ ∂yJSFt (ybt , ybt ) becomes 0 ∈
[













from the analysis of cases (d-i) and (d-ii) that the sub-differential ∂zJSFt (ybt , ybt ) goes
from [−βαbst , 0] for ybt = zbt to [0, βαbst ] for the case ybt = zcbt , hence 0 ∈ ∂zJSFt (ybt , ybt ).
It follows from (3.19) that in this case 0 ∈ ∂yJSFt (ybt , ybt ) = β[−αbst , αbst ].
Part (e): Again consider the following four cases.
Case (e-i) yst < xt: Now the policy prescribes z∗t = xt and y∗t = yst , and the sub-
differential ∂zJSFt (xt, yst ) =
[
Kt(xt) + βαbst − λbst ,Kt(xt) + βαbst
]
. It follows from
(3.15) and (3.16) that this sub-differential ranges from [−λbst , 0] for xt = zbt to
[βαbst − λbst , βαbst ] for xt = zcbt ; hence 0 ∈ ∂zJSFt (xt, yst ) for all zbt ≤ xt ≤ zcbt .
Similarly, ∂yJSFt (xt, yst ) = β
(






; it follows from (3.20) that this
sub-differential is zero.
Case (e-ii) ybt ≤ xt ≤ yst : In this case z∗t = y∗t = xt and the sub-differential
∂zJ
SF
t (xt, xt) =
[
Kt(xt)− λbst ,Kt(xt) + βαbst
]
. It follows from cases (3.15) and
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(3.16) that this sub-differential ranges from [−βαbst − λbst , 0] for z∗t = xt = zbt to
[−λbst , βαbst ] for xt = zcbt ; hence 0 ∈ ∂zJSFt (xt, xt) for all zbt ≤ xt ≤ zcbt . Similarly,
∂yJ
SF
t (xt, xt) = [ft−αst +HSF
′




t (xt)], and from (3.19) and (3.20)
it follows that −ft−αbt ≤ HSF
′
t (xt) ≤ −ft +αst for ybt ≤ xt ≤ yst , hence ∂yJSFt (xt, xt)
ranges from [−αbst , 0] to [0, αbst ] as xt goes from ybs to yst , hence 0 ∈ ∂yJSFt (xt, xt).
Case (e-iii) xt < ybt ≤ zcbt : Now z∗t = y∗t = ybt > xt, and ∂zJSFt (ybt , ybt ) =[
Kt(ybt ),Kt(y
b




. This sub-differential ranges from [−βαbst , 0] for xt = zbt

















t )] = β[−αbst , 0], hence
0 ∈ ∂zJSFt (ybt , ybt ).
Case (e-iv) xt < zcbt < ybt : Now z∗t = zcbt and y∗t = ybt > z∗t . It follows







t ) = β
(







Part (h): Consider the following four cases.







t ) = β
(






= 0, and ∂zJSFt (zst , ybt ) = Kt(zst ) − λbst .
Hence zst is a solution to Kt(zst ) = λbst as claimed in (3.18)
Case (h-ii) zst < yst : Now the theorem indicates z∗t = y∗t = zst , and it follows from
(3.18) that ∂zJSF (zst , zst ) = [Kt(zst )− λbst ,Kt(zst ) + βαbst − λbst ] = [0, βαbst ]. Likewise
∂yJ
SF (zst , z
s










t )], and from (3.19) and (3.20)




t ) ≤ −ft+αst for ybt ≤ zst ≤ yst , hence ∂yJSFt (zst , zst )
ranges from β[−αbst , 0] to β[0, αbst ] as zst goes from ybs to yst , hence 0 ∈ ∂yJSFt (zst , zst ).







t ) = β
(






= 0 from (3.20). Likewise ∂zJSFt (zcst , yst ) =
Kt(zt) + βαbst − λbst , and zcst as a solution to Kt(zt) = −βαbst + λbst as claimed in
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(3.17). We can establish that zcbt ≤ zcst ≤ zst by comparing (3.16), (3.17) and (3.18),
and observing that Kt is a nondecreasing function.
Case (h-iv) zcst ≤ yst ≤ zst : This theorem prescribes z∗t = y∗t = yst , and from (3.20)










t )] = β[0, α
bs].
The sub-differential ∂zJSFt (yst , yst ) =
[
Kt(yst )− λbst ,Kt(yst )− λbst + βαbst
]
It follows
from cases (h-i) and (h-ii) that ∂zJSFt (yst , yst ) goes from [−βαbst , 0] for yst = zcst to
[0, βαbst ] for yst = zst .
Part (g): Consider the following four cases.
Case (g-i) zcst ≤ yst < xt: The optimal policy prescribed by the theorem is z∗t =
y∗t = y
s
t . The sub-differential ∂zJSFt (yst , yst ) =
[
Kt(yst )− λbst ,Kt(yst )− λbst + βαbst
]
.
It follows from (3.17) and (3.18) that this sub-differential ranges from [−βαbst , 0] to
[0, βαbst ] as xt ranges from zst to zcst , hence 0 ∈ ∂zJSFt (yst , yst ). Similarly it follows from










t )] = β[0, α
bs].
Case (g-ii) yst < zcst < xt: Now z∗t = zcst > y∗t = yst . It follows from (3.17)
and (3.20) that ∂zJSFt (zcst , yst ) = Kt(zcst ) − λbst + βαbst = 0 and ∂yJSFt (zcst , yst ) =




t )] = 0.
Case (g-iii) ybt ≤ xt ≤ yst : In this case z∗t = y∗t = xt and ∂zJSFt (xt, xt) =[
Kt(xt)− λbst ,Kt(xt) + βαbst
]
; this sub-differential ranges from [−βαbst , λbst ] to [0, λbst +
βαbst ] as z∗t = xt increases from zcst to zst , thus we conclude that 0 ∈ ∂zJSFt (xt, xt).
Similarly, ∂yJSFt (xt, xt) = β[ft − αst + HSF
′




t (xt)] which ranges
from β[−αbst , 0] to β[0, αbst ] as y∗t = xt ranges from ybt to yst .









; this sub-differential ranges from [−βαbst , λbst −











t )] = 0.
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Part (f): Consider the following three cases.
Case (f-i) yst < xt: The prescribed policy is y∗t = yst < z∗t = xt, and the sub-
differential is ∂zJSFt (xt, yst ) =
[
Kt(zt)− λbst + βαbst ,Kt(zt) + βαbst
]
which ranges
from [βαbst −λbst , βαbst ] to [0, λbst ] as zt increases from zcbt to zcst , hence, 0 ∈ ∂JSFt (zt).




t )] = 0.
Case (f-ii) ybt ≤ xt ≤ yst : Now the prescribed optimal policy is z∗t = y∗t = xt, and
the sub-differential ∂zJSFt (xt, xt) =
[
Kt(xt)− λbst ,Kt(xt) + βαbst
]
which ranges from
[−λbst , βαbst ] to [−βαbst , λbst ] as xt increases from zcbt to zcst , hence, 0 ∈ ∂zJSFt (xt, xt).











ranges from [−αbst , 0] to [0, αbst ] as xt increases from ybt to yst .
Case (f-iii) xt < ybt : Here the theorem prescribes z∗ = xt < y∗t = ybt , and the




which ranges from [−λbst , 0]
to [−βαbst , λbst − βαbst ] as xt increases from zcbt to zcst , hence, 0 ∈ ∂zJSFt (xt, ybt ). It




t )] = 0♦.
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